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I. TOM AND NEWBERG AND THE INNOVATION MARKET MYTH
A. Increasing American Competitiveness
The American antitrust authorities are now, as never before,
trying to encourage firms to develop new products and services. 1
The Department of Justice's ("DOd") current attempt to require
the Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft") to sell its Internet Ex-
plorer as a separate product from its Windows operating system
illustrates the tremendous effort the authorities are making to
regulate firms' competition to innovate.
By encouraging firms to innovate, the authorities have repeat-
edly said they are making the American economy more produc-
tive and more competitive. Because it so important that they do
this, the authorities continue, they must make their drive to en-
courage firms to innovate the focus of their antitrust enforce-
ment efforts. The agencies' current attempt to implement their
"new thinking" on innovation is therefore not only the most im-
portant development this decade in the field of competition pol-
icy, it is also one of the most important developments in the en-
tire field of American economic policy.
B. Innovation Markets as the "Centerpiece" of this "New
Thinking"
According to at least one authority, the "centerpiece" of the
agencies' "new thinking" on innovation are "innovation markets."
According to the agencies, "innovation markets" are markets in
which firms compete to make new and better products.
"Innovation," say the agencies, is itself the product of these inno-
vation markets.
1 See Thomas N. Dahdouh & James F. Mongoven, The Shape of Things to Come: In-
novation Market Analysis in Merger Cases, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 405, 405 (1996) (discussing
current trend of innovation market analysis); see also Robert J. Hoerner, Innovation
Markets: New Wine in Old Bottles, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 50 (1995) (indicating that
agencies' view of innovation markets as markets for research and development); James
B. Kobak, Jr. Running the Gauntlet: Antitrust and Intellectual Pitfalls on the Two Sides
of the Atlantic, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 341, 351-52 (1996) (discussing difference between
United States and European views on antitrust); Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of
the Innovation Market Approach to Merger Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 19, 22 (1995)
(indicating increased use of innovation markets in antitrust analysis).
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C. Congress Creates, Agencies Develop, Innovation Market
Concept
Congress created innovation markets when it enacted the Na-
tional Cooperative Research Act ("NCRA"). 2 The agencies have
now further developed the innovation market concept. The
agencies developed the idea that firms compete in an innovation
market, most importantly, in their 1995 Joint Intellectual Prop-
erty Licensing Guidelines 3 ("I.P. Guidelines"). In the I.P. Guide-
lines, the agencies stated that in appropriate cases, they will
analyze a transaction's "competitive effect in a separate innova-
tion market."' 4 The agencies use their guidelines to establish and
explain their policies and priorities. The agencies have clearly
shown their intention to regulate competition in innovation mar-
kets by choosing to explain their policy of finding innovation
market in these guidelines.
Agency officials have also written numerous articles and given
many speeches in which they have repeated the I.P. Guideline's
assertion that the agencies have regulated competition in inno-
vation markets. These officials have also claimed that the agen-
cies will continue to find innovation markets, and that, to in-
crease the competitiveness of American industry, the agencies
must continue to do so.
D. The Innovation Market Myth
Both the antitrust officials and the I.P. Guidelines have cre-
ated the innovation market myth by repeatedly claiming that the
agencies have found innovation markets and that the agencies
must do so to upgrade the American economy. 5 In reality, the
agencies have never found an innovation market.
Continuing this tradition of speeches and articles, FTC Offi-
cials Willard Tom and Joshua Newberg recently published in the
2 See The National Cooperative Research and Production Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-5
(1993).
3 See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guide-
lines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13, at 132
(1995).
4 Id. at §3.2.3.
5 Many commentators have assumed that the agencies find innovation markets. See,
e.g., Andrew Chin, The Misapplication of Innovation Markets to Biotechnology Mergers, 3
B. U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. J. (forthcoming 1997).
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Antitrust Law Journal yet another article in which they claim
that the agencies have found innovation markets.6 In this arti-
cle, however, these two officials actually acknowledge that in
some cases in which other officials have claimed that the agen-
cies found innovation markets, the agencies have in fact not
found innovation markets.
This article is perhaps more important than the other articles
in which officials have claimed that the agencies have found in-
novation markets since Tom and Newberg acknowledge that in
some case the agencies have in fact not found an innovation
market. This acknowledgment is misleading because it reaf-
firms the innovation market myth by giving credence to innova-
tion market critics in certain cases. Tom and Newberg therefore
have continued to propagate the innovation market myth.
These officials cite three cases in which they claim that the
agencies have found an innovation market. This article will
show, however, that the agencies have not actually found an in-
novation market in any of these three cases, or in other cases.
Consequently, these officials should not continue to propagate
the innovation market myth.
II. INNOVATION MARKETS AND THE AGENCIES' "NEW THINKING"
ON INNOVATION
A. Introduction
During the past decade, antitrust authorities have intensively
studied how firms develop new products and services, as well as
how they can use antitrust laws to encourage firms to do so. The
agencies' current efforts to encourage firms to innovate repre-
sents not only the most important antitrust development of the
decade, but also one of the most important developments in the
entire field of American economic policy.
6 See Wilard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property:
Front Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L. J. 167, 222 (1997) (discussing
introduction of innovation markets).
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B. Innovation Markets As the "Centerpiece" of this "New
Thinking"
Many people have come to believe that the agencies' attempts
to define an innovation market is an integral part of the agen-
cies' efforts to regulate competition to innovate. One authority,
Richard Brunell, the assistant editor of the Antitrust Law Jour-
nal, has claimed that: "The centerpiece of the Clinton Admini-
stration's 'new thinking' on innovation was its development of an
'innovation market' approach to merger enforcement; that is, an
approach that specifically analyzes the effect of proposed merg-
ers on innovation."7
Brunell wrote this while introducing his journal's symposium
on innovation markets. He correctly identified the agencies' em-
phasis upon innovation markets. As another authority has said,
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has come to see innova-
tion markets as its "theory de jour."8 Additionally, agency offi-
cials, such as the head of the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice, continue to stress the importance of innovation
markets.9
These writings and speeches have helped to create the inno-
vation market myth. Many authorities, including Brunell, as-
sume that simply because the agencies claim to have found an
innovation market, then they have in fact done so. Yet, while
the agencies have certainly done much important "new thinking"
regarding how firms innovate, they have not made innovation
markets "the centerpiece" of this "new thinking."
7 See Richard M. Brunell, Symposium: A Critical Appraisal of the "Innovation Mar-
ket" Approach, Editors Note, 64 ANTITRUST L. J. 1, 2 (1995). Brunell's piece introduces a
series of articles on innovation markets. Id.; see also George A. Hay, Innovations in Anti-
trust Enforcement, 64 ANTITRUST L. J. 7, 8 (1995). Hey presciently observes that
"speeches often reflect more what an administration would like to do, or would like its
audience to think that it will do, rather than what is has done, is now doing, or will ac-
tually do in the near future." Id.
8 See Joseph Kattan, Intellectual Property Antitrust Enforcement. Beyond the Guide-
lines, ANTITRUST LITIGATOR, Apr. 1995, at 4.
9 See Joel I. Klein, Cross-Licensing and Antitrust Law, Address Before the American
Intellectual Property Law Association (May 1997).
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C. "New Thinking" on Competition to Innovate
1. New, Crucial, Focus of Antitrust
Brunnell correctly stated that the antitrust authorities have
developed much "new thinking" regarding how firms innovate. 10
The agencies are trying to develop new ways of regulating mar-
kets so that competitive forces not only induce firms to lower
their prices, but also to develop new and better products. As
Brunell implied, the agencies' attempt to develop the innovation
market concept demonstrates how hard the agencies are working
to try to use the antitrust laws to encourage firms to innovate.
While the agencies invested a considerable amount of time de-
veloping their "new thinking" before the DOJ brought its current
action against Microsoft, the Microsoft case has brought this im-
portant issue to the public's attention. 11 The DOJ's recent at-
tempt to make Microsoft sell its Internet Explorer and Windows
operating systems as separate products has shown managers,
economists and lawyers how hard the agencies are working to
encourage firms to innovate; the action has also led the general
public to debate antitrust issues in a way it has not for at least a
generation. 12 Indeed, as one writer has said, "[T]he case has the
potential to become the most significant in antitrust history."'13
As the Microsoft case illustrates, when managers create new
products and services, and then develop marketing plans to sell
these new products and services, they must consider how the
antitrust authorities will evaluate their activities. Managers
must include the antitrust authorities' "new thinking" into their
calculus when they develop their business strategies. 14 But, as
10 See, e.g., William E. Cohen, Competition and Foreclosure in the Context of In-
stalled Base and Compatibility Effects, 64 ANTITRUST L. J. 535, 536 (1996) (examining
new lines of analysis in antitrust theory); see also FTC Staff Report: Competition Policy
in the New High-Tech, Global Marketplace, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 791, 791 (1996) (discussing
new approaches to antitrust law).
11 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In this
action DOJ seeks to enforce a consent decree it and Microsoft had previously entered. Id.;
see also <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases3/micros>; <http://www.microsoft.com>. Micro-
soft and DOJ both make available, on their websites, all the documents it has filed in this
case. Id. See generally Mark Furse, United States v. Microsoft Ill-Considered Antirust,
INT'L REV. L., COMPUTERS & TECH., (forthcoming) (1998).
12 See, e.g., John Cassidy, The Force of an Idea, NEW YORKER, Jan. 12, 1998, at 32
(exhibiting degree of attention popular press has paid to Microsoft litigation).
13 See Furse, supra note 11.
14 See, e.g., Kevin P. Coyne & Ren6e Dye, The Competitive Dynamics of Network-
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one business journal has pointed out, 15 when evaluating how
this "new thinking" will affect their business strategy, managers
must consider not only the Microsoft case, but also other cases,
such as Ciba Geigy/Sandoz16 and Microsoft/Intuit.17 When
evaluating these cases, managers and lawyers must not be con-
fused or misled by the innovation market myth.
D. Porter, the Agencies' "New Thinking," and the Innovation
Market Myth
1. Michael Porter and Competition to Innovate
The agencies often say that they must implement their "new
thinking" on innovation so they can increase America's interna-
tional competitiveness. To explain how the agencies can use
their "new thinking" to increase America's competitiveness, the
authorities often cite Michael Porter's best selling study, The
Competitive Advantage of Nations.18 Not unsurprisingly, Por-
ter's study found that a firm must innovate to succeed. Porter
stressed that innovative firms succeed both at home, and per-
haps more importantly, abroad. Thus, Porter concluded, to in-
crease the ability of its firms to succeed in world markets, a na-
tion's policymakers must increase the ability of its nation's firms
to innovate. Moreover, Porter also explained why governments
should use competition policy as an important component of
their general economic policy of encouraging firms to innovate.
In The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Porter laid the
foundation for the antitrust authorities' "new thinking" on com-
petition to innovate. He not only showed why governments must
encourage firms to innovate, but how governments can use com-
petition policy to encourage firms to innovate. Porter said poli-
cymakers must ensure that market forces drive firms to innovate
Based Businesses, 76 HARv. Bus. REV. 99, 99 (1998). These writers show how firms can
use network effects to develop competitive advantage, and that when firms develop such
strategies they must consider how antitrust law affects their strategies. Id.; see also Wil-
liam E. Cohen, supra note 10, at 536. The author explains why managers must also
evaluate whether antitrust authorities may come to believe the firm introduction of new,
innovative product for anticompetitive purposes. Id.
15 See, e.g., Why Bill Gates Should Worry, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 1997, at 106.
16 See Ciba Geigy Ltd., FTC File No. 961-0055 (March 24, 1997).
17 See Microsoft Corp. Civ. No. 94-1564 (D.D.C. filed April 27, 1995) (explaining
hostile takeover strategies of industry giant Microsoft).
18 See MICHAEL PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 143 (1990).
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in order to encourage firms to generate new products and serv-
ices. Authorities must aggressively enforce the antitrust laws to
ensure that market forces drive firms to innovate. 19 Because
The Competitive Advantage of Nations shows why competition
policy must be an important part of a nation's attempts to create
innovative firms, American antitrust authorities often cite this
work to justify their attempts to develop "new thinking" regard-
ing competition to innovate. In fact, Porter himself endorsed the
authorities' view that his work justified their attempts to de-
velop "new thinking" on innovation.20
2. Porter and the Innovation Market Myth
The authorities often cite The Competitive Advantage of Na-
tions to justify both their attempts to develop "new thinking" on
innovation and their attempts to find innovation markets. By
doing so, the agencies have used Porter's well-regarded work to
further propagate the innovation market myth. The authorities,
however, have created the false impression that Porter endorses
innovation markets. While Porter does believe that the authori-
ties should encourage firms to innovate, he has not endorsed the
innovation market concept.
Anne Bingaman, head of the DOJ's Antitrust Division when it
issued the I.P. Guidelines, stated that The Competitive Advan-
tage of Nations showed that "a strong antitrust policy, especially
in the area of horizontal mergers, alliances and collusive behav-
ior, [was] essential to the role of upgrading any economy." 21 She
concluded that "the lesson from Professor Porter's book [was]
19 See id. at 662-64.
20 See PORTER, supra note 18, at 5. In the post-war era..."there has been, and con-
tinues to be, a focus in antitrust analysis on price/cost margins, or the ability of an indus-
try to elevate price above cost (allocative efficiency)." Id. Indeed, if one examines the
Merger Guidelines, this is the central metric by which welfare is determined. Id. More
recently there has been a growing concern with economies of scale (or static efficiency),
driven by Chicago School economics. Id. Only scant attention is paid to innovation or
progressiveness as an important goal that antitrust policy should concern itself with. Id.
Most recent discussion of innovation is framed in static efficiency terms, allowing col-
laboration to avoid waste and duplication of R & D, for example. Id. My view is that we
must turn this ranking of goals of antitrust on its head .... The central focus of antitrust
policy, in my view, ought to be on fostering progressiveness, defined broadly to include
not only technological innovation but new ways of competing in product, marketing,
service, and so on. Id. at 5.
21 See Anne Bingaman, The Role of Antitrust in Intellectual Property, Speech Before
the Federal Circuit Judicial Conference (Patent & Trademark Session), Jun. 16, 1994.
The DOJ has continued to make this speech, and many of Bingaman's other speeches
available on its website <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/speeches/index.html>. Id.
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that innovation thrives in markets that are competitive. 2 2
In this speech, then Assistant Attorney General Bingaman
further stated that her department implemented Porter's policy
prescriptions in its actions against General Motors 23 and Flow
International,24 two cases in which the DOJ claimed to have
found innovation markets. Bingaman said that these two cases
showed that "enforcement activities in the merger area also
demonstrate that antitrust enforcement has an important role to
play in spurring innovation." 25
Furthermore, in 1995, two then-high-ranking DOJ officials
also relied heavily on Porter's work when they explained why the
agencies should find innovation markets. 26 In their influential
law review article, Richard Gilbert and Steven Sunshine care-
fully analyzed the economic arguments supporting and opposing
the agencies' policy of finding innovation markets. Not surpris-
ingly, these DOJ officials concluded that the agencies should find
innovation markets. Gilbert and Sunshine relied most heavily
on Porter's authority in reaching this conclusion. 27
Following the Gilbert and Sunshine article, FTC lawyers Tho-
mas Dahdouh and James Mongoven wrote another article ex-
plaining why the agencies should find innovation markets.28
They explained that the agencies should find innovation mar-
kets, among other reasons, to implement Porter's policy recom-
mendations. According to Dahdouh and Mongoven, The Com-
petitive Advantages of Nations demonstrated that "innovation
22 See id.
23 See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., Civ. No. 93-530 (D. Del. filed Nov. 16,
1993).
24 See United States v. Flow Int'l Corp. No., Civ. 94-71320 (E.D. Mich. filed Apr. 4,
1994).
25 See id.
26 See Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency
Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 580
(1995) (discussing Michael Porter's theories on competition spurring innovation); see also
William F. Baxter, The Definition and Measurement of Market Power in Industries Char-
acterized by Rapidly Developing and Changing Technologies, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 717, 728
(1984) (explaining different markets where innovation sparks competition); Joseph Kat-
tan, Antitrust Analysis of Technology Joint Ventures: Allocative Efficiency and the Re-
wards of Innovation, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 937, 941 (1993) (articulating innovation's compe-
tition concerns for non-products).
27 See Lawrence B. Landman, The Economics of Future Goods Markets, 21 W. COMP.
L. & ECO. R. 3 (1998).
28 See Dahdouh & Mongoven, supra note 1, at 406 (indicating need to examine inno-
vation markets in merger analysis); see also Robert J. Hoerner, Innovation Markets: New
Wine in Old Bottles?, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 49 (1995) (critiquing innovative market the-
ory and practice).
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contributes greatly to international competitiveness. ' 29 Thus,
Dahdouh and Mongoven concluded that agencies should protect
competition in innovation markets to increase America's inter-
national competitiveness.
Further, before concluding that innovation markets were the
"centerpiece" of the agencies' "new thinking" on innovation,
Richard Brunell explained the economic theories that inspired
the agencies' development of their "new thinking."30 Brunell ex-
plained that Porter led the agencies to develop their "new
thinking." Thus, Brunell implied, Porter inspired the agencies to
develop the not only their "new thinking" on innovation, but also
the "centerpiece" of this "new thinking," which he said are inno-
vation markets. 31
E. Tom and Newberg and the Innovation Market Myth
1. Continuing the Myth
Tom and Newberg continue the agencies' tradition of writing
articles, and giving speeches, in which agency officials claim that
the agencies find innovation markets. They, therefore, also con-
tinue the agencies' practice of propagating the innovation market
myth started by Gilbert and Sunshine32 and continued by
Dahdouh and Mongoven and other agency officials. 33 For ex-
ample, former FTC Commissioner Varney wrote an oft-cited ar-
ticle in which she also claimed that the agencies have, and will,
find innovation markets.34
By continuing to claim that the agencies have found innova-
tion markets, Tom and Newberg continue to propagate the myth
that the agencies have indeed found innovation markets. As this
article will illustrate, however, the agencies have never found an
29 See Dahdouh & Mongoven, supra note 28, at 408.
30 See Brunell, supra note 7, at 4.
31 See id. Along with Porter, Brunell also cited F. M. Scherer. Scherer has done im-
portant work, in particular regarding the relationship between market structure and in-
novation. This relationship, however, does not relate to innovation markets. Id.; see also
FREDERIC SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH: SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVES (1984).
32 See Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 26, at 570 (delineating innovation markets).
33 See Dahdouh & Mongoven, supra note 1, at 408 (articulating underpinnings of in-
novation market analysis).
34 See Christine A. Varney, Antitrust and the Drive to Innovate: Innovation Markets
in Merger Review Analysis, 9 ANTITRUST 16, 19 (1995) (reasoning collusion in highly con-
centrated innovation market may occur).
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innovation market. This article will also show that since the
agencies have not found an innovation market, innovation mar-
kets are certainly not the "centerpiece" of the agencies "new
thinking" on innovation.
2. Harm of the Myth
By continuing to propagate the innovation market myth, Tom
and Newberg mislead managers and lawyers. Managers must
understand the agencies' "new thinking" on innovation in order
to develop and implement their business strategies. If manag-
ers, and their legal counsel, misunderstand the agencies "new
thinking," then they will recommend steps that are inconsistent
with the policy the agencies are actually implementing. For ex-
ample, lawyers may fear that the agencies will use the innova-
tion market concept to block a particular transaction. 35 They
may, therefore, recommend that their clients not enter into the
relevant transaction. But if the agencies would actually not have
used the innovation market concept to block this transaction,
then the lawyers would be recommending that their clients not
enter into a transaction which may have been not only perfectly
legal, but also economically efficient.
In short, the innovation market myth leads managers and
lawyers to misunderstand the agencies "new thinking" on inno-
vation. If managers and lawyers misunderstand the agencies'
"new thinking," then firms may take actions that are inconsis-
tent with the agencies' actual innovation policy. By continuing
to propagate the innovation market myth, Tom and Newberg
continue the agencies' unfortunate practice of misleading man-
agers and lawyers.
As Michael Porter said, the United States must develop inno-
vative firms to remain internationally competitive. Policymak-
ers must develop and implement a coherent, reasonable innova-
tion policy to develop these innovative firms. Policymakers will
only be able to implement this policy if the firms they are trying
to influence understand the policy. Yet, by propagating the in-
35 See id. (reasoning attorneys will not know when innovation market will be found
or which firms will compete); see also Joseph F. Brodley, Proof of Efficiencies in Mergers
and Joint Ventures, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 576, 576 (1996) (concluding efficiency considera-
tions affect merger analysis); Thomas N. Dahdouh, The Shape of Things to Come. Inno-
vation Market Analysis in Merger Cases, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 405, 405 (1996) (explaining
innovation market analysis is not designed merely to ensure pro-enforcement outcomes).
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novation market myth, the agencies actually confuse firms.
They increase the likelihood that firms will act inconsistently
with the agencies actual innovation policy. The agencies should,
therefore, stop propagating the innovation market myth.
III. CONGRESS CREATES INNOVATION MARKETS
A. Definition
Innovation market analysis assumes that firms compete in a
separate market to make new products or provide new services.
Clearly, firms compete to sell existing goods and services. 36 Just
as clearly, firms compete in technology markets by licensing
comparable technologies. The innovation market concept hy-
pothesizes that, in addition to these markets, the market to de-
velop new products is itself a separate market which antitrust
authorities can identify. Innovation, say the authorities, is itself
the "product" of this innovation market.
B. Congress Enacts Statute Creating Innovation Markets
1. National Cooperative Research and Production Act
As far back as 1984, Congress endorsed, if not created, the
idea that firms compete in innovation markets. When Congress
enacted the National Cooperative Research Act,37 it lowered the
antitrust liability of certain joint ventures. In the NCRA, Con-
gress said that when applying the antitrust laws to appropriate
joint ventures, the agencies should find, and evaluate competi-
tion in what it called "R&D markets," which are innovation mar-
kets. Congress instructed the courts and agencies to "take into
account all relevant factors affecting competition, including, but
not limited to, effects on competition in properly defined, rele-
vant research, development, product, process, and service mar-
36 See Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 26, at 573 (hypothesizing that innovation is
form of non-price competition consumers can benefit from); see also Dahdouh, supra note
2, at 414 (stating internal consumption of innovation reduces potential reward to other
innovators).
37 See The National Cooperative Research and Production Act, 15 U.S.C. §4301
(1993).
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kets." 38
2. Legislative History: Strong Endorsement
In the NCRA's legislative history, Congress explained why it
developed the innovation market concept. It also offered the
agencies guidance to help them define an innovation market.
The Senate Report recognized that Congress created the innova-
tion market concept because it felt that the agencies must pro-
tect competition in research and development ("R&D") to develop
competitive firms. The report stated: "Competition is as impor-
tant in R&D as it is in any other commercial endeavor. Indeed,
in many industries, particularly those that are based on rapidly
evolving technology, competition in R&D may be crucial to suc-
cess."
39
The report then offered the agencies guidance in defining an
innovation market:
[T]o be included in the relevant R&D market... [F]irms need
not currently compete with one another at the production or
marketing stage. Market shares in current markets or in
projected future markets will not be determinative of a
firm's ability and incentive to compete in a relevant R&D
market. Rather, the facilities, technologies, and other assets
to which firms have access are crucial to evaluating R&D
competitiveness. 40
Thus, the report stated that the agencies should do more than
simply evaluate competition in what it called "projected future
markets." The report also indicated that the agencies should not
consider a firm's market share in a future goods market to be
"determinative" of the firms' market share of an innovation mar-
ket. Instead, when evaluating whether a firm has the incentive
and ability to compete in an innovation market, the report stated
that agencies should also evaluate the firms' "facilities, tech-
nologies, and other assets." The report, however, does not say
how agencies should evaluate these facilities, technologies and
38 See The National Cooperative Research and Production Act, 15 U.S.C. §4302
(1993). The Act outlines the rule of reason standard which the courts and agencies must
sometimes apply. Id.
39 See S. REP. No. 98-427, at 21 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3105, 3131;
H. R. CONF. REP. No. 1044, at 1044 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3105, 3131.
40 See id.
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assets. Nor does the report say how agencies should relate these
facilities, technologies, and assets to innovation markets. At
best, the report offers the agencies only limited guidance.
3. Congress Did Not Define Innovation Market
More importantly, neither the NCRA nor its legislative history
define an innovation market. The NCRA provides that the
agencies should protect competition in innovation markets, yet it
does not define an innovation market. It simply states that
agencies should protect competition in "properly defined" R&D
markets. The Senate report offered the agencies some guidance
in defining an innovation market, but it still does not define an
innovation market.
Congress created the idea that the agencies can and should
protect competition in innovation markets in the NCRA. Con-
gress required the agencies to find innovation markets when
they evaluate joint ventures subject to the Act. By implication,
Congress also endorsed the agencies' current attempts to broadly
regulate competition in innovation markets. Revealingly, how-
ever, Congress did not define an innovation market. It appar-
ently could not do so.
IV. AGENCIES EXPAND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
A. Introduction
Although Congress created the innovation market concept, the
agencies now apply the concept more broadly than Congress
originally instructed. The agencies apply the innovation market
concept to many types of transactions in addition to joint ven-
tures subject to the NCRA. The agencies have also attempted to
define an innovation market both in their 1995 I.P. Guidelines
and in Gilbert and Sunshine's influential article. 41
41 See Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 26, at 588 (identifying circumstances that
hamper and aid innovation market analysis); see also Thomas L. Hayslett III, Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property: Harmonizing the Commercial Use of
Legal Monopolies with the Prohibitions of Antitrust Law, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 375, 378
(1996) (arguing antitrust law and intellectual property protection have common policy
goals).
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B. Intellectual Property Licensing Guidelines
In the I.P. Guidelines, the agencies defined an innovation
market to a limited extent. The I. P. Guidelines build on the
market definition policies of the agencies' 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines ("Merger Guidelines"). 42  These Merger
Guidelines stated that a firm has market power if it can raise
the price of a good without causing a significant number of cus-
tomers to buy other goods instead. Similarly, the I.P. Guidelines
provided that a firm has market power in an innovation market
if it can lower its R&D spending without causing other firms to
correspondingly increase their R&D investments. The I.P.
Guidelines required the agencies to also consider other factors,
such as the unique research capabilities of the relevant firms,
before concluding that a firm has market power in an innovation
market. Additionally, the I.P. Guidelines also required the
agencies to consider how the transaction may improve innova-
tion efficiencies.
C. Gilbert and Sunshine's Methodology
In an influential law review article, Gilbert and Sunshine ex-
panded the I.P. Guidelines' innovation market methodology.
These two then-high ranking DOJ officials developed a five-step
methodology that they contend allowed the agencies to identify
an innovation market. 43 The five steps of this methodology are:
42 See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines (1992), 4 Trade Reg., Rep. (CCH) 13, 104 (1992); see also Joseph
Kattan, After the IP Guidelines: Trends in Intellectual Property Antitrust Enforcement, 11
ANTITRUST 26, 27 (1997) (using proper merger of Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz to demonstrate
technologies were not ready for commercialization within narrow time frame); Lawrence
B. Landman, Did Congress Actually Create Innovation Markets?, 13 BERKLEY TECH. L.
REV. 721, 728 (1998) (discussing market power with respect to prices of goods and abil-
ity to buy other goods).
43 See Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 26, at 594-97 (expanding innovation market
approach by including assessments of market concentration, competitive effects on in-
centives and efficiencies); see also Robert P. Taylor & Matthew E. Carswell, Research into
Developing New Idea. Innovation Markets, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 1996,
51, at 63 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course handbook Se-
ries No. 449, 1996) (stating arguments against implementation of innovation market ap-
proach may be appropriate). But see Andrew Chin, Analyzing Mergers in Innovation
Markets, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 119, 135 (1998) (finding Gilbert and Sunshine do not suggest
procedure for combining evidence about innovation efforts of merging parties with evi-
dence about innovation market structure).
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1. Identify Competing R&D Programs
Gilbert and Sunshine acknowledge that the "product" of an in-
novation market cannot be all the innovations that the relevant
firms may be trying to develop. The authors said that competing
R&D programs are R&D programs that use the same specific
R&D assets, and which, if successful, will allow the relevant
firms to make the same future product.
2. Identify Alternative Sources of R&D.
Gilbert and Sunshine then asked the agencies to identify the
innovation market's potential competitors. Thus, any firm in-
vesting in the relevant R&D, and trying to innovate, is already
competing in the innovation market. Therefore, in this step,
Gilbert and Sunshine asked the agencies to identify the firms
that may, in the future, acquire the relevant R&D assets and try
to develop the relevant innovation.
3. Evaluate Competition From Downstream Products
Downstream products are products other firms already sell.
The authors ask the agencies to identify these products because,
the authors believe, these products will put competitive pressure
on an R&D monopolist and encourage or force it to continue to
invest in R&D. This step relates very closely to step four.
4. Increase in Competition in R&D.
Gilbert and Sunshine fear that an innovation market monopo-
list, exercising its monopoly power, will cut back its R&D in-
vestments. The authors, therefore, ask the agencies to evaluate
an innovation market monopolist's incentives to invest in R&D.
The agencies should not approve transactions that would lower
firms' incentives to invest in R&D, believe Gilbert and Sunshine.
5. Assess R&D Efficiencies
A transaction may allow the relevant firms to generate the
same innovation at lower cost. Gilbert and Sunshine believe
that the agencies should evaluate whether the transaction will
indeed allow the firms to achieve greater R&D efficiencies.
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V. AGENCIES CANNOT APPLY INNOVATION MARKET
METHODOLOGY
A. Find a Future Goods Market, Not an Innovation Market
In reality, the agencies cannot use Gilbert and Sunshine's
methodology to find an innovation market. The methodology
only actually allows the agencies to find a future goods market,
not an innovation market. 44 As the following analysis shows,
Gilbert and Sunshine's innovation market methodology is un-
workable. It actually allows the agencies to find no more than a
future goods market.
1. Identify Competing R&D Programs
The author's first step requires the agencies to identify the
relevant firms' competing R&D programs. According to Gilbert
and Sunshine, these competing R&D programs require the firms
to use the same specific R&D assets, and produce the same fu-
ture product. However, as innovation market critics have
pointed out, if the agencies apply this test broadly, then they will
identify firms that will actually never compete against each
other as competitors. 45
The agencies have implicitly acknowledged the validity of this
criticism. As the following analysis of decided cases will show,
the agencies have only found that firms are competitors if they
will actually compete in the future. The agencies have, there-
fore, avoided applying the innovation market concept in the
overly broad fashion which the innovation market critics feared
they would. By doing so, however, the agencies have found fu-
44 See Landman, supra note 42, at 756 (1998) (discussing how agencies have found
future goods markets rather than innovation markets). See generally Special Report,
FTC Staff Report: Competition Policy in the New High-Tech, Global Market place, 64
ANTITRUST L.J. 791, 794 (1996) (illustrating how transaction combining existing innova-
tion effort with competing innovation effort may lessen innovation competition).
45 See Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to
Merger Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L. J. 19, 20 (1995) (stating innovation market approach
represents leap into unknown, with potential for harm to economic welfare equal to that
of any potential benefits); see also Taylor & Carswell, supra note 43, at 66 (stating one
difficulty in identifying participants in particular R&D market is deciding where to look);
Nicholas A. Widwell, The Crystal Ball of Innovation Market Analysis in Merger Review:
An Appropriate Means of Predicting the Future?, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 369, 392 (1996)
(listing problems with Gilbert and Sunshine method of determining scope of innovation
market).
1998]
242 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 13:223
ture goods markets rather than innovation markets.
2. Identify Alternative Sources of R&D
Gilbert and Sunshine's second step requires the agencies to
identify the innovation market's potential competitors. Yet firms
investing in the relevant R&D, and trying to develop the rele-
vant innovation, are already competing in the relevant innova-
tion market. Potential competitors into the innovation market
are firms that may try to develop the relevant innovation.
Many firms may, in the future, try to develop just about any
innovation. Firms themselves often do not know what innova-
tions they may try to develop in the future. If the firms them-
selves do not know what innovations they may try to develop,
then the DOJ or the FTC certainly can not know what innova-
tions these firms may try to develop. The agencies can therefore
not identify potential competitors into an innovation market.
3. Evaluate Competition From Downstream Products
Since this step relates so closely to step 4, the discussion of
step 4 above also relates to this step.
4. Increase in Competition in R&D
Gilbert and Sunshine's fourth step requires the agencies to de-
termine an innovation market monopolist's incentives to inno-
vate. This step requires the agencies to ensure that firms do not
use their market power in an innovation market to retard the
pace of innovation.
But the agencies cannot evaluate a firm's incentives to inno-
vate. Even an innovation market monopolist may face a strong
incentive to innovate. If such a monopolist were the only firm
able to develop and sell a new product, such as new life saving
drug, they it would certainly face a strong incentive to innovate.
If it developed and sold this product, then it would earn monop-
oly profits. 46
46 See Landman, supra note 42, at 756. By preserving competition in future goods
market the agencies insure that even when an innovation market monopolist develops
the relevant product, it will not monopolize that future market. Id.; see also John
Shepard Wiley, Jr. et al., The Leasing Monopolist, 37 UCLA L. REV. 693, 721 (1990)
(explaining monopolist can sell to initial period lows only by lowering price which results
in problematic abandonment of monopoly rents).
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5. Assess R&D Efficiencies
The authors' fifth step requires the agencies to assess efficien-
cies. This step asks the agencies to determine what R&D effi-
ciencies, if any, the relevant transaction will create. Yet, in their
1997 amendments to their 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
the agencies acknowledge that they can not readily assess R&D
efficiencies. 47
B. Agency Actions
As the analysis of Gilbert and Sunshine methodology implies,
the agencies have actually protected competition in a future
goods markets rather than an innovation market. Indeed, an
analysis of the cases in which the agencies claim to have found
innovation markets will confirm this.48
1. Early DOJ Actions: Flow International and Wright Medical
Technology
The agencies claim to have found innovation markets in many
cases. In these cases, however, the agencies have actually only
found future goods markets. For example, in Flow International,
49 the DOJ opposed Flow International's attempt to buy Inger-
soll-Rand's Waterjet Cutting Systems Division because the com-
bined firm would control 90% of the relevant goods market, and
because the DOJ alleged the transaction would harm competi-
tion in the future goods market for better ultra-high pressure
waterjet intensifier pumps.
Similarly, in Wright Medical Technology,50 the FTC protected
47 See Revision to Horizontal Merger Guidelines, available in 1997 WL 166999 1, *1
(acknowledging efficiencies are difficult to verify/quantify because much available infor-
mation is possessed by merging firms); see also Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised
United States Merger Enforcement in a Global Economy, 81 GEO L.J. 195, 244 (1992)
(arguing efficiency is virtually impossible to measure with respect to R&D); Rapp, supra
note 45, at 19 (arguing new approach is needed to deal with mergers that harm innova-
tion since conventional product or technology analysis is inadequate).
48 See Landman, supra note 42, at 721 (extensively analyzing cases in this section).
49 See United States v. Flow Int'l Corp., Civ. No. 93-530, 94 (dealing with future
goods market analysis).
50 See Wright Med. Tech., Inc., 60 Fed. Reg. 480, 480 (1995) (accepting proposed con-
sent agreement providing Wright would grant non-exclusive license of Orthomet/Mayo
technology to Mayo); see also Mark D. Whitener, Competition and Antitrust Enforcement
in the Changing Pharmaceutical Marketplace, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 301, 306 (1995)
(commenting on antitrust concerns arising in pharmaceutical mergers including elimi-
nation of competition).
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the future goods market for the next generation of orthopedic
hand implants. The FTC prevented Wright Medical from pur-
chasing its only potential competitor in the future implant mar-
ket since Wright Medical already controlled 95% of the implant
market. [Orthomet as developing the next generation of im-
plant.]
2. General Motors/ZF Friedrichshafen
The DOJ also opposed ZF Friedrichshafen's ("ZF") attempt to
purchase General Motors' ("GM") heavy-duty automatic trans-
mission business.5 1 ZF and GM were the world's two major
manufacturers of heavy-duty automatic transmissions. In the
United States, however, the firms competed in only two narrow
product markets. The DOJ opposed the sale because it alleged
that these firms could only develop better transmissions if they
continued to compete against each other in the broad innovation
market to make better transmissions, 52 not just in the two nar-
row product markets in which they actually competed in within
the United States.
But the firms competed in the broad market for many types of
heavy-duty automatic transmissions in Europe. Thus, in this
case, the firms competed in the broad future goods market, as
well as the broad current goods market. The DOJ, however,
could not assume jurisdiction over this current goods market.
Since it could not assert jurisdiction over the current goods mar-
ket, it asserted jurisdiction over what it called an innovation
market.
The DOJ used the concept of an innovation market to assert
jurisdiction over the firms' competition in the European current
goods markets. The DOJ should not have tried to assume juris-
diction over this market. It should have let the proper antitrust
authority regulate competition in that market. The European
antitrust authority was more appropriate than that of the
United States.53
51 United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., Civ. No. 93-530 (D. Del. Filed Nov. 16, 1993).
52 See generally Brunell, supra note 7, at 2 (noting DOJ expressed concern that
merger would eliminate significant rivals for competition).
53 See Landman, supra note 42, at 762 (stating DOJ should not have used innovation
spillover effects to create doctrine which would give almost any antitrust authority ju-
risdiction over broad range of transactions).
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3. Sensormatic Electric Co.
In another important case, Sensormatic Electric Co., the FTC
opposed Sensormatic's attempt to license intellectual property
relating to Knogo Corp.'s anti-shoplifting equipment business. 54
These firms were developing the next generation system of
shoplifting detection. This new system would allow manufactur-
ers to imbed the appropriate electronic marker directly into their
products. If not removed when a customer purchased an item,
these markers would sound the alarms located at the store's exit.
The FTC feared that the licensing agreement would both allow
the relevant firms to improperly develop industry standards and
lower the firms' incentives to innovate. Manufactures and re-
tailers could only use the next generation system if their elec-
tronic markers and alarms used compatible, standardized tech-
nology. The FTC believed that if these two firms worked
together, such a standard would be reached, thereby excluding
their competitors from the market.
In addition, the FTC also feared that the licensing agreement
between the firms would lower the firms' incentive to innovate.
The agreement provided that the firms had to inform each other
of any improvements made to the relevant technology. The FTC
reasoned that because the agreement required each firm to share
the results of its R&D efforts with the other, each firm may not
make the R&D investments it otherwise would have made. The
FTC therefore issued what it felt to be the appropriate order to
protect competition in the future goods market for the next gen-
eration of anti-shoplifting equipment. 55
54 See Sensormatic Elec. Corp., 60 Fed. Reg. 5428, 5428 (1995) (focusing on market
for research and development for future technologies); see also Varney, supra note 34, at
19 (noting Sensormatic provides good example of innovation markets in understanding
all ramifications of competition).
55 The complaint, in paragraph 11, refers to the markets for the "research and devel-
opment of disposal labels." The complaint, therefore, seems to identify a market to de-
velop the ability to develop the new anti-shoplifting equipment (disposable labels) rather
than the market for new equipment itself. This complaint, in reality, focuses on the mar-
ket for the new equipment.
Whenever the agencies regulate future markets they issue orders which relate to the
relevant firms' ability to develop the new product, and to compete in the future market.
In fact, even when the agencies analyze traditional current markets they still, implicitly,
analyze the relevant firms' ability to develop and manufacture the relevant products.
Thus, whenever the agencies analyze a current or future market, they, to some extent,
analyze the relevant firms' ability to develop and manufacture the relevant product. This
complaint, therefore, says explicitly what other companies say implicitly. It actually adds
nothing. Further, the agencies can not claim that they have found an innovation market
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4. Pharmaceutical Cases
The FTC has often protected competition in future goods mar-
ket for pharmaceutical products. For example, in American
Home Products Co.,56 the FTC opposed American Home Prod-
uct's purchase of American Cyanamid in part because the firms
were two of only three firms trying to develop rotavirus vac-
cines.57 In this case, the FTC preserved competition in the fu-
ture goods market for rotavirus vaccines, which did not then ex-
ist. Similarly, in Glaxo PLC,58 the FTC required Glaxo to sell
Wellcome's oral antimigrane R&D program before allowing
Glaxo to purchase its pharmaceutical rival Wellcome. 59 The
FTC thereby preserved competition in the future goods market
for oral antimigrane treatments. When Upjohn and Pharmacia
merged, the FTC required these firms to sell specific technology
related to their attempts to develop new treatments for solid tu-
mors. 60 Finally, in Baxter Int'l Corp., 61 the FTC opposed Baxter
International's purchase of Immuno International because they
were the only firms seeking FDA approval to sell fibrin sealant
in this case simply because they drafted a complaint which says explicitly what other
companies say implicitly.
56 American Home Prods. Corp., 60 Fed. Reg. 60807, 60807 (1995) (preserving com-
petition in future goods market for rotovirus vaccines); see also Mark D. Whitener, Com-
petition and Antitrust Enforcement in the Changing Pharmaceutical Marketplace, 50
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 301, 305 (1995) (listing five reasons FTC opposed American Home
Products- American Cyanimid merger).
57 Id.
58 See Glaxo plc., 60 Fed. Reg. 16139, 16139 (1995) (preserving competition in future
good market for oral antimigraine treatments); see also Kevin J. Arquit & Richard Wolf-
ram, Mergers & Acquisitions: United States Government Antitrust Analysis and En-
forcement, in 38TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW INSTITUTE, 459, at 550 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac-
tice Course Handbook Series No. 1049, 1998) (explaining Glaxo agreed to divest itself of
R&D assets in order to gain approval of acquisition of Wellcome); John Temple Lang,
European Community Antitrust Law: Innovation Markets and High Technology Indus-
tries, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 717, 749 (1997) (noting Glaxo's divestiture of Wellcome's
R&D was crucial to merger).
59 See Lang, supra note 58, at 749.
60 See Upjohn Co., 60 Fed. Reg. 56153, 56153 (1995) (preserving competition in fu-
ture goods market for future treatment of solid tumors); see also Taylor & Carswell, su-
pra note 43, at 59 (explaining FTC claim that Upjohn and Pharmacia were two of few
firms in their particular market).
61 See Baxter Int'l Inc., 62 Fed. Reg. 408, 408 (1997) (preserving competition in fu-
ture goods market for fibrin sealants); see also Carl Shapiro & Michael Sohn, "Crown
Jewel" Provisions in Merger Consent Decrees, 12 ANTITRUST 27, 29 (1997) (claiming FTC
was concerned about Baxter/Immuno merger because of potential loss of competition in
relevant market); Gearl Sobel, Exploitation of Patents and the Antitrust Laws, in
TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND LITIGATION 1996, 683, at 794 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 477, 1997) (explaining con-
sent order for Baxter/Immuno merger required Baxter to license Immuno's fibrin sealant
product to commission approved licensee).
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in the United States. 62 In all of these cases, the FTC protected
competition in the future goods market for pharmaceutical prod-
ucts that the relevant firms were attempting to develop but did
not yet sell.
5. Ciba-Geigy
Lastly, in its highly publicized Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz decision, 63
the FTC allowed Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz to merge only after they
agreed to license technology relating to their gene therapy re-
search programs. 64 The FTC feared that the merger of the
world's two leading gene therapy researchers would harm com-
petition in the future gene therapy market in two separate ways.
First, the FTC feared that the merger would allow the merged
firm to monopolize four specific future goods markets, which it
identified. Second, the FTC also feared that because Ciba Geigy
and Sandoz were the only two firms that controlled both the pat-
ent and other intellectual property rights which any firm would
need to develop gene therapy products, by joining together these
firms could exclude others from the broad gene therapy market.
In Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz, therefore, the FTC acted both to protect
competition in four future goods markets and to regulate how
the firms combined intellectual property rights. In this case,
however, the FTC did not find an innovation market.
C. FTC Concedes that it Finds Only a Future Goods Market
The FTC staffs noted report on the "High Tech Global Mar-
ketplace"65 and one FTC Commissioner herself actually agree
with this article's analysis. Both authorities acknowledge that
the agencies only find future goods markets rather than innova-
tion markets. The staff report made the telling observation that:
In terms of how to define the scope of an "innovation mar-
ket," the IP Guidelines approach of focusing on "research
62 See Sobel, supra note 61, at 794.
63 See Ciba Geigy Ltd., FTC File No. 961-0055 (Mar. 24, 1997) (preserving competi-
tion in future goods market for four specific gene therapies); see also Joseph Kattan, After
the IP Guidelines: Trends in Intellectual Property Antitrust Enforcement, 11 ANTITRUST
26, 27 (1997) (noting Ciba-Geigy/ Sandoz merger broke new ground in alleging adverse
impact on innovation competition in gene therapies).
64 See Ciba Geigy Ltd., FTC File No. 961-0033 (Mar. 24, 1997).
65 See High Tech Global Marketplace, supra note 10, at 791.
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and development directed to particular new or improved
goods or processes" seems most useful. One witness sug-
gested that access to specialized assets could also be the ba-
sis for identifying substitutable innovation efforts and for
assessing the relative competitive significance of market
participants. Such an approach has received some attention.
This approach might well be sufficient to cabin the agency's
analysis, yet the issue ultimately would lead back to the po-
tential existence of a good. This is, in asking whether a firm
possessed "specialized assets," one would need to ask:
"specialized assets necessary to produce what types of
goods?" At the moment, it seems inevitable that an innova-
tion market will be defined with respect to an ultimate goods
market, such as "R&D directed at [a class of products]."66
An "ultimate goods market" is of course a future goods market.
Thus, when the agencies define an innovation market "with re-
spect to" an "ultimate goods market," they are in reality defining
a future goods market rather than an innovation market.
1. Commissioner Azcuenaga
In a recent speech, FTC Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga ac-
knowledged that the agencies find only future goods markets. 67
The Commissioner stated:
The critiques of the innovation market theory raise serious
questions regarding how far it should be pursued, at least
given our current knowledge. Nonetheless, the valid criti-
cisms of the theory seem to apply to its application in a
broad sense to the concept of innovation. They do not seem
to undercut our antitrust concerns for future competition in
a specific product that is already under development. Al-
most all the FTC cases have involved research and develop-
ment by a very few firms of a pharmaceutical product to
remedy a particular disease or condition. The Commission
has focused on future competition to manufacture and sell
the particular drug in question and not the general level of
research or development in the pharmaceutical industry. 68
66 See id. (emphasis added).
67 See Mary L. Azcuenaga, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Recent Highlights and
Uncertainties, Speech before the American Law Institute-American Bar Association, Apr.
24, 1997, available at <http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/azcuenagelali-aba97.htm>.
68 See Mary L. Azcuenaga, Panel Discussion on Technological Innovation, Interna-
tional Trade and Competition Policy, Remarks before the Japan Fair Trade Commission
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In her speech, Commissioner Azcuenaga discussed Ciba Geigy
at length. She recognized that "the breath of the patent may
have been a concern."69 But she also said that "another possibil-
ity is that the Commission has decided to extend the innovation
market theory quite beyond what we have seen before."70 As
this article detailed above, however, the FTC did not find an in-
novation market in this case.
VI. TOM AND NEWBERG: INNOVATION MARKETS TO EVALUATE THE
NEXT GENERATION OF PRODUCT
A. Officials Acknowledge that in Several Cases Agencies did not
Find Innovation Markets
Tom and Newberg acknowledged that the agencies could have
analyzed cases such as the pharmaceutical cases discussed above
without finding innovation markets. 71 They acknowledged that
when the agencies analyzed cases such as these, "the potential
competition doctrine, with a few adjustments, could be used to
analyze the competitive effects and would reach similar results
as analyzing the transaction's current effects in an innovation
market."72  In previous writings and speeches in which other
agency officials developed the innovation market myth, these of-
ficials claimed that the agencies found innovation markets in the
pharmaceutical cases. 73 Tom and Newberg, therefore, made an
important concession when they acknowledged that the agencies
50th Anniversary Symposium, Dec. 1, 1997, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/azcuenaga/japan97.htm (emphasis added). Commissioner
Azcuenaga repeated this analysis in December 1997 when she said that the FTC is
"continuing to allege a diminution of competition in research and development markets
for specific products." Id.
69 See Azcuenaga, supra note 68.
70 See id.
71 See Tom & Newberg, supra note 6, at 223-24 (1997) (discussing pharmaceutical
cases).
72 See id. at 223. On the following page, however, the authors go on to say that: "One
might want to make further adjustments in order to capture innovation effects in those
markets (i.e. the elimination of the competition to develop the drugs, not just the compe-
tition between the drugs once developed and approved), but one would not necessarily
need the concept of innovation markets if one preferred instead to expand modestly the
scope of the potential competition doctrine." Id. at 224.
73 See, e.g., Dahdouh & Mongoven, supra note 1, at 406. In previous writings and
speeches in which other agency officials developed the innovation market myth, these
officials claimed that in these cases the agencies did find innovation markets. Id.
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could have analyzed these cases without finding innovation mar-
kets.
Despite this acknowledgment, however, Tom and Newberg
still claimed that the agencies have found innovation markets.
The authors stated that in "cases involving competition to pro-
duce the next-generation product, where the contours of that
product are not completely clear, are harder to analyze without
the innovation market concept."74 The authors then discussed
three cases, Ciba Geigy/Sandoz, Sensormatic, and GM/ZF, in
which they implied that the agencies applied innovation market
analysis. Tom and Newberg did not actually say that the agen-
cies found innovation markets in these cases. As this section
makes clear, the agencies did not find innovation markets in
these cases.
B. Agencies did not Find Innovation Markets
1. Ciba Geigy/Sandoz
a) Firms not Trying to Develop Next Generation Product
The authors implied that the agencies must use innovation
markets to analyze cases in which "the contours of the next gen-
eration product are not completely clear."75 The authors pointed
to Ciba Geigy/Sandoz as an example of the existence of an inno-
vation market. The authors therefore implied that the FTC
analyzed a transaction in which the relevant firms were trying to
develop the next generation of a product.
In Geigy/Sandoz, however, the relevant firms were not trying
to develop the next generation of a product. The relevant firms
were trying to develop an entirely new class of products. The
four specific future goods markets identified by the FTC were all
related to new gene therapy treatments. 76 The broader market,
which the FTC also regulated in this case, was the broad market
for new gene therapy products. As the FTC itself said, "no gene
74 See Tom & Newberg, supra note 6, at 224.
75 See id. at 224 (stating at time of merger, gene therapy products were not available
in U.S.); see also FTC News Release, Dec. 17, 1996, available at <http://www.ftc.gov>
(explaining gene therapy is new treatment mechanism).
76 See Ciba Geigy Ltd., FTC File No. 961-0055 (Mar. 24, 1997), Complaint at IV.
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therapy product has yet been approved by the FDA for commer-
cial sale."77 The FTC did not expect Novartis, the merged firm,
to begin selling gene therapy products for approximately four
years.78 In this case the FTC did not regulate the next genera-
tion of any product.
b) FTC Regulates Combination of Intellectual Property
Rights
(1) Did Not Find Innovation Market
a) Introduction
Rather than regulating the next generation market, the FTC
protected competition in four specific future goods markets, and
also prevented the merging firms from improperly blocking ac-
cess to the broad gene therapy market. The FTC feared that the
merged firm, Novartis, would control such a broad array of pat-
ents and related intellectual property that it would be able to
stop other firms from entering this broad gene therapy market.
Tom and Newberg implied that the FTC must find an innova-
tion market to support an order preventing a merger that they
perceived would block access to the broad gene therapy market.
This conclusion is not premised on sound reasoning. The FTC
could protect competition in the broad gene therapy market
without finding an innovation market in this case, and it in fact
did so. The FTC stopped the merging firms from combining their
intellectual property rights in a manner it felt would be anti-
competitive without finding an innovation market.
b) Do Not Explain Methodology
Tom and Newberg did not explain the methodology they be-
lieved the FTC used to find an innovation market. Indeed, the
authors only implied that the agencies found an innovation mar-
ket in this case. As discussed previously, Gilbert and Sunshine's
innovation market methodology only allows the agencies to find
77 See id.
78 See id. "The first regulatory approvals for commercial sales of gene therapy prod-
ucts, expected by the year 2000, will most likely be in the area of cancer treatment of
brain tumors." Id.
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future goods markets, and not innovation markets. 79 Therefore,
if Tom and Newberg believe that the FTC found an innovation
market in this case, then they must explain the methodology the
agencies used to find this innovation market. Unfortunately,
however, the authors failed to explain the methodology they be-
lieve the FTC applied.
c) Improperly Combining Intellectual Property Rights
Finally, and perhaps more fundamentally, the authors simply
do not explain why the FTC must have found an innovation
market in this case to support its order. In its Analysis of Pro-
posed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment ("Analysis to Aid
Public Comment"), the FTC explained that the merger would
give Novartis an "unmatchable portfolio of intellectual property
assets that are necessary to commercialize gene therapy prod-
ucts,"80 and that "the merger may heighten barriers to entry by
resulting in one entity holding so extensive a portfolio of patents
and patent applications, of uncertain breadth and validity, as to
diminish its incentives to license, thus impeding the ability of
other gene therapy researchers and developers to continue de-
veloping their products." 81
The FTC therefore offered a simple and direct explanation for
its actions. The FTC said that it required Novartis to license its
technology because it wanted to insure that Novartis would not
have such a broad portfolio of intellectual property rights that it
could block access to the relevant market. To ensure that No-
vartis did not have such a broad intellectual property portfolio,
the FTC did not need to find an innovation market. Tom and
Newberg therefore made this case seem more complex than it ac-
tually is. The FTC did not need to find an innovation market to
respond to its antitrust concerns in this case because it could
have respond to these concerns in other ways.
79 See Landman, supra note 42, at 725-26; see also Nicholas A. Widnell, Comment,
The Crystal Ball of Innovation Market Analysis in Merger Review: An Appropriate Means
of Predicting the Future?, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 369, 380 (1996) (indicating that in inno-
vation market analysis competition between companies that produces no direct revenue).
80 See FTC, Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment 410
[hereinafter Analysis to Aid Public Comment].
81 See id. at 411; see also Microsoft Corp., Civ. No. 94-1564 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 27,
1995) Complaint at VII (discussing how merger may lessen competition and create mo-
nopoly).
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d) Improperly Combine Production Facilities Claim Inaccurate
The authors implied that the FTC acted, not only to protect
competition in the four specific future goods markets and in the
broad future gene therapy market, but also to stop the firms
from combining their production facilities in an anticompetitive
manner:
While there were many firms doing innovative research in
the field, all the firms other than Ciba and Sandoz were pur-
suing their research with the understanding and expectation
that, if they were to make any breakthroughs, they would
commercialize those breakthroughs by joint venturing or
contracting with either Ciba or Sandoz or by selling either
their specific rights or their entire companies to Ciba or
Sandoz. 82
But the Analysis to Aid Public Comment cited by Tom and
Newberg does not support this conclusion. 83 The Analysis to Aid
Public Comment, however, makes two observations that seem to
support Tom and Newberg's conclusion at first glance. The
Analysis stated that Ciba and Sandoz were the only two firms
that had both the broad patent portfolios and commercialization
skills required by any firm to market gene therapy products.
Additionally, the Analysis to Aid Public Comment further stated
that the two merging firms were "rival centers" that licensed in-
tellectual property rights in return for "marketing and other
rights."84
Having made these observations, however, the Analysis to Aid
Public Comment contradicts Tom and Newberg. "Competitors
already have (to varying degrees) the hard assets, e.g. production
facilities, researchers and scientists, needed to compete. Rivals
and other scientists confirm that licensing would enable them to
develop gene therapy products and replace the competition lost
due to the merger."85 Thus, the FTC acknowledged that com-
petitors could produce any gene therapy product they may de-
velop. What these competitors lacked, however, was access to
the intellectual property needed to first develop these new gene
82 See Tom & Newberg, supra note 6, at 227.
83 See Analysis to Aid Public Comment, supra note 80, at 412.
84 See id.at 411.
85 See id.
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therapy products.
In addition, the FTC order further showed that the FTC did
not fear that the merger would harm other firms' ability to com-
mercialize any gene therapy product they may develop. The FTC
ordered Novartis to license various intellectual property rights.
The FTC did not order Novartis to help its competitors commer-
cialize, as opposed to develop, gene therapy products in any
way.86
The FTC naturally issues orders that it believes will correct
antitrust problems. The FTC believed that ordering Novartis to
license this intellectual property would help Novartis' competi-
tors develop gene therapy products. It did not issue the order to
help Novartis' competitors commercialize any gene therapy
product. Clearly, the FTC acted because it feared that the
merger would harm other firms' ability to develop gene therapy
products. Thus, contrary to Tom and Newberg's assertions, the
FTC did not fear that the merger would harm other firms' ability
to commercialize their gene therapy products in this case.
Finally, Tom and Newberg failed to explain why, even if the
FTC feared that the merger would harm other firms' ability to
commercialize their products, this would lead the FTC to find an
innovation market. If Novartis were able to stop other firms
from commercializing the products they developed, then it would
be blocking these firms access to the market. If this were the
case, then the FTC should have issued an order granting Novar-
tis' competitors access to the relevant market. But to do this, the
FTC would not need to find an innovation market.
In relation, the authors do not explain how Gilbert and Sun-
shine's innovation market methodology helped the FTC issue an
order granting other firms access to the relevant market. Gil-
bert and Sunshine's innovation market methodology in no way
relates to the problem of one firm blocking other firms' access to
the relevant market. Thus, even if the FTC did believe that No-
vartis could stop its competitors from commercializing their
products, the FTC could not have used innovation market
86 See Tom & Newberg, supra note 6, at 227. The authors discuss the possibility that
another firm may commercialize a "breakthrough." Id. The authors do not make clear
whether "breakthrough" refers to a product or merely the technology to make this prod-
uct. Id. This discussion assumes the authors mean a product. Id. However, even if the
authors do mean the technology to make a product, and not the product itself, this sec-
tion's analysis would not change.
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analysis to correct this problem.
Tom and Newberg therefore incorrectly described the FTC's
reasoning. The FTC did not believe that others firms needed
Ciba Geigy, Sandoz, or Novartis' help to commercialize their
gene therapy products. The FTC did not fear that the merger
would stop these firms from commercializing their technological
"breakthroughs." Rather, the FTC feared that the merger would
stop the firms from developing these breakthroughs in the first
place. For this reason, the FTC issued the its order.
c) Inconsistent with Baxter
(1) Tom and Newberg Acknowledge FTC did not Find
Innovation Market in Baxter
Further, the authors' analysis of Ciba Geigy is inconsistent
with their analysis of Baxter International.87 Tom and Newberg
acknowledged that the FTC could have analyzed Baxter without
finding an innovation market. 88 Yet, they did not explain how
they distinguished Baxter International from Ciba Geigy. In
fact, it does not appear that they can.
In Baxter International,89 the FTC reviewed Baxter's purchase
of Immuno International. The FTC found, among other things,
that the transaction raised competitive problems relating to fi-
brin sealants. 90 At the time of the merger, no firm sold fibrin
sealants in the United States. The FTC alleged that Baxter and
Immuno were two of only a few firms seeking approval to sell fi-
brin sealants in the United States.
The authors included Baxter International among the cases in
which they believed the FTC regulated future markets for "new"
drugs. 91 In this case the relevant firms were two of only a few
trying to develop the same new drug. As Tom and Newberg ac-
87 See Baxter Int'l Inc., 62 Fed. Reg. 408, 408 (1997); see also Tom & Newberg, supra
note 6, at 224 (stating innovation market analysis is most helpful where firms compete to
produce next-generation product).
88 See Tom & Newberg, supra note 6, at 223-24. Baxter was one of the series of
pharmaceutical cases which the authors acknowledged that the agencies could analyze
without finding an innovation market.
89 62 Fed. Reg. 408 (1997).
90 Fibrin sealants help stop bleeding, and help wounds heal.
91 See Tom & Newberg, supra note 6, at 224. Since firms already sold fibrin sealant
in Japan and Europe, in this case the FTC may actually have only regulated a future
goods market for the next generation of an already existing drug. Id.
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knowledged, the FTC responded to the antitrust problem it saw
without finding an innovation market in this case.
Yet, the FTC faced the same situation in Ciba Geigy that it
faced in Baxter International. In Ciba Geigy, as in Baxter Inter-
national, the relevant firms were two of only a few trying to de-
velop the relevant new drug. In both of these cases, the FTC saw
an antitrust problem, and therefore regulated the relevant fu-
ture goods markets. Tom and Newberg cannot distinguish these
cases simply on the ground that the FTC found four future goods
markets in Ciba Geigy and only one such market in Baxter.
(2) In Both Cases FTC Regulated Combining of Intellectual
Property Rights
Moreover, Tom and Newberg cannot distinguish these cases
because the FTC regulated how the firms combined their intel-
lectual property rights in Ciba Geigy. In Ciba Geigy, the FTC
regulated how the relevant firms combined their intellectual
property rights. And because the FTC did so, Ciba Geigy indeed
differs from many other future goods market cases.
In Baxter International, the FTC also regulated how the firms
combined their intellectual property rights. Regarding entry
into the fibrin sealants market, the complaint stated that "[t]he
existence of broad patents governing the formulations and the
manufacture of such products make new entry both difficult and
unlkely."92 Thus, in both Ciba Geigy and Baxter International,
the FTC regulated how the relevant firms combined their intel-
lectual property rights. Thus, while Ciba Geigy differed from
other future goods markets cases, so too does Baxter Interna-
tional. Baxter International and Ciba Geigy differ from the other
future goods market cases in exactly the same way but they do
not differ from each other.
In Ciba Geigy, the FTC ordered the relevant firms to license a
broader array of intellectual rights than it did in Baxter Interna-
tional. This difference, however, does not allow Tom and New-
berg to distinguish these two cases. In Ciba Geigy, as the
Analysis to Aid Public Comment makes very clear, the FTC
feared that Novartis' would be able to use its broad intellectual
92 See Baxter Int'l Inc., 62 Fed. Reg. at 408.
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property portfolio to block access to the relevant market. 93 It,
therefore, ordered the merged firm to license the appropriate in-
tellectual property rights.
In Baxter International, the FTC similarly feared that the
firms would be able to block access to the relevant market if they
combined their intellectual property rights. Thus, in Baxter In-
ternational, the FTC ordered the merged firm to license the ap-
propriate intellectual property rights as well. Tom and Newberg
cannot distinguish these cases simply because in Ciba Geigy the
FTC ordered the merged firm to license a broader array of intel-
lectual property rights. While the facts of Ciba Geigy required
the FTC to order the merged firm to license a broader array of
intellectual property rights than it did in Baxter Internationl, the
FTC enforced the same underlying principle in both cases in the
same way.
d) Commissioner Azcuenaga
(1) May Have Found Innovation Market
In a recent speech, Commissioner Azcuenaga discussed Ciba
Geigy in great detail. The Commissioner said that "the language
of the complaint and the remedy suggest that the breath of the
patent may have been a concern." 94 As discussed above, the FTC
did indeed fear that the merger would give Novartis an overly
broad portfolio of patent and other intellectual property rights.
The Commissioner also implied, however, that the FTC may
have found an innovation market in this case. The Commis-
sioner said, "another possibility is that the Commission has de-
cided to extend the innovation market theory quite beyond what
we have seen before." But, said the Commissioner "the precise
concern is not well described in the complaint." 95
The Commissioner is certainly correct about her observation
the FTC did not adequately explain its actions in this case.
Close examination of Commissioner Azcuenaga's analysis, how-
93 See Analysis to Aid Public Comment, supra note 80; see also Azcuenaga, supra
note 68 (discussing breadth of relevant market).
94 See Azcuenaga, supra note 67. See generally Complaint, supra note 76 (containing
language of complaint); Analysis to Aid Public Comment, supra note 80 (containing lan-
guage of remedy).
95 See Azcuenaga, supra note 67.
1998] 257
258 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 13:223
ever, reveals no evidence suggesting that she actually believed
that the FTC found an innovation market in this case.
(2) Criticizes Remedy
In her speech, the Commissioner repeated her criticism of the
FTC decision in Ciba Geigy that she had offered in her partial
dissent in the Ciba Geigy case itself.96 Commissioner Azcuenaga
questioned why the FTC ordered Novartis to grant non-exclusive
licenses of the relevant intellectual property, particularly of the
so-called Anderson patent. The Commissioner acknowledged
this was a very broad patent issued by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office. Commissioner Azcuenaga noted that the Pat-
ent and Trademark Office had the responsibility and the particu-
lar expertise to issue patents. This Office decided to issue this
broad patent. The Commissioner concluded that the FTC, which
lacks both the relevant responsibility and expertise, should not
second guess the Patent and Trademark Office.
The Commissioner further noted that the FTC should not use
this merger to regulate the breadth of this one patent. While
antitrust law allows the FTC to regulate how firms combined
related patents, it did not allow the FTC to issue an order relat-
ing to the Andersen patent because the firms were not combining
related patents. Sandoz controlled the Anderson patent, but
Ciba Geigy controlled no comparable patent. Thus the firms
were not combining comparable patents. Commissioner
Azcuenaga concluded that the FTC therefore did not have
authority to issue an order relating to the singular Anderson
patent.
The majority clearly rejected Commissioner Azcuenaga's ar-
gument. 97  Apparently, the majority believed that the law
authorized it to order Novartis to license the Andersen patent.
First, the majority appears to have reasoned that it was ordering
Novartis to license, not just the Andersen patent, but a series of
patents and intellectual property rights. Secondly, the majority
appears to have reasoned that in the economic context this case
presented to it, it was appropriate, and, therefore, within its
authority, to issue the order it did in fact issue.
96 See Ciba Geigy Ltd., FTC File No. 961-0055 (Mar. 24, 1997).
97 See id.
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(3) Commissioner and Majority Do Not Discuss Innovation
Markets
(a) Introduction
Commissioner Azcuenaga and the majority were not arguing
about whether the FTC should find an innovation market in this
case. Neither the Commissioner nor the majority actually dis-
cussed innovation markets. Neither said that it believed that in
this case the FTC should find an innovation market. The Com-
missioner and the majority are simply discussing the FTC's
authority to issue orders relating to patents. Neither side ar-
gued that the FTC should find an innovation market.
(b) Commissioner Does Not Believe FTC Should Have Found
an Innovation Market
Commissioner Azcuenaga certainly did not believe that in this
case the FTC should have found an innovation market. In her
partial dissent, the Commissioner suggested that rather than
order Novartis to license the Anderson patent and other intellec-
tual property, the FTC should have ordered Novartis to sell the
shares it owned of various firms that were performing gene ther-
apy R&D. For the FTC issue this order, it need not find that
Ciba Geigy and Sandoz competed in an innovation market.
(c) FTC Did Not Find an Innovation market
(i) Commissioner Raises Possibility
Not only did Commissioner Azcuenaga not believe that the
FTC found an innovation market in this case, but neither did the
FTC itself. Commissioner Azquenaga raised the possibility that
the FTC found an innovation market in this case in her speech.
The Commissioner said:
Another possibility is that the Commission had decided to
extend the innovation market theory quite beyond what we
have seen before. Perhaps the Commission identified a nar-
row and specific competitive concern related to the Anderson
patent. This alternative is a possibility because the com-
plaint alleges increased barriers to entry and altered incen-
tives to license patents, but the precise concern is not well
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described in the complaint."98
In this passage the Commissioner did not describe her con-
cerns particularly well. The Commissioner may mean that the
innovation market that the FTC conceivably found related to the
"narrow and specific competitive concern related to the Anderson
patent." Alternatively, "this narrow and specific concern" may
be separate from the innovation market which the FTC may
have found. The Commissioner could have meant that the
"narrow and specific concern" gave the FTC an alternative rea-
son to act, in addition to its decision to act because it found an
innovation market.
If the Commissioner meant that the "narrow and specific com-
petitive concern related to the Anderson patent" offered a sepa-
rate basis than the innovation market concept upon which the
FTC could act, then the Commission has not offered any expla-
nation regarding how, why, or what extent, the FTC may have
found an innovation market.
But even if the Commissioner did mean that the FTC's con-
cerns relating to the Anderson patent may have lead it to find an
innovation market, she still does not explain herself very well.
The Commissioner does not explain how the FTC's concern re-
garding a patent could lead it to find an innovation market. In-
novation markets supposedly help the agencies regulate compe-
tition between to two or more firms who are both trying to
innovate. Innovation, not patents, are the supposed "product" of
innovation markets.
(ii) FTC Did Not Find an Innovation Market
The FTC expressed concern over the breadth of the Anderson
patent. The FTC feared that this overly broad patent would al-
low Novartis to block access to the relevant market. But the
FTC did not, and could not, use innovation market analysis to
resolve the antitrust problems it perceived regarding the breadth
98 See Azcuenaga, supra note 67. The Commissioner said: "Another possibility is that
the Commission had decided to extend the innovation market theory quite beyond what
we have seen before. Perhaps the Commission identified a narrow and specific competi-
tive concern related to the Anderson patent. This alternative is a possibility because the
complaint alleges increased barriers to entry and altered incentives to license patents,
but the precise concern is not well described in the complaint." Id.
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of the Anderson patent. Commissioner Azcuenaga did not ex-
plain why, if the FTC stopped Novartis from using a broad pat-
ent for anti-competitive purposes, it must therefore have found
an innovation market. Indeed, this conclusion does not follow
logically.
Nor does it logically follow, as the Commissioner implies that
it does, that the FTC found an innovation market in this case be-
cause "the complaint alleges increased barriers to entry and al-
tered incentives to license patents." Regarding barriers to entry,
whenever any court or agency analyzes the scope and breath of
any patent or patent acquisition, it will almost invariably discuss
barriers to entry and incentives to innovate. The agencies and
courts regulate how firms acquire patents exactly because they
fear that if firms acquire too broad a patent portfolio, they may
use it to create barriers to entry to the relevant market.
Regarding altered incentives to license patents, supporters of
innovation market methodology argue that it allows the agencies
to regulate firms' incentives to innovate. These supporters do
not even claim that innovation market analysis allows the agen-
cies to regulate firms incentives to license technology. 99
Thus, Commissioner Azcuenaga has not explained why the
FTC may have found an innovation market in this case. 100 The
Commissioner herself does not believe that the FTC should have
found an innovation market in this case. Therefore, while
Commissioner Azcuenaga and the other Commissioners disa-
greed about the Commission's authority to issue orders relating
to patents, particularly the Anderson patent, there is no evidence
that indicates that the FTC found an innovation market in this
case.
99 See Landman, supra note 42, at 756. Even if one accepted the notion, which
Commissioner Azquenaga does not say, that in Ciba Geigy the FTC feared that the
agreement would lower Novartis' incentives to innovate, it still does not follow that the
FTC found an innovation market in that case. Id. The agencies stop firms from using
patents, and other intellectual property rights, to monopolize markets because the agen-
cies fear that, as monopolists, the firms will face a lesser incentive to innovate. Id. There-
fore, whenever the agencies analyze the scope and breath of any patent or patent acqui-
sition they inevitably consider the relevant firms' incentives to innovate. Id.
Further, in this case, as in all these so-called innovation market cases, the FTC could
not analyze the merged firm's incentives to innovate, at least not in the manner innova-
tion market analysis requires. Id. The FTC could not analyze Ciba Geigy's incentive to
suppress technology. Id.
100 See Azcuenaga, supra note 68 (noting FTC may have found innovation market in
Ciba-Geigy).
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2. Sensormatic
a) Imply FTC Found an Innovation Market
Tom and Newberg believe that the FTC found Sensormatic
"harder to analyze without the innovation market concept."''1 1
The authors therefore imply that the FTC found an innovation
market. The authors are of course wrong about this case as well.
In this case the FTC did not find an innovation market.
b) Case More Complex than Tom and Newberg Acknowledge
Sensormatic was actually more complex than Tom and New-
berg describe. Both parties involved in this case were trying to
develop the next generation anti-shoplifting system. Knogo had
patented the technology, called SuperStrip technology, to be used
in its new system.
As the transaction was originally planned, Kongo was sell
Sensormatic all of its assets outside of North America. Knogo
also planned to sell to Sensormatic the exclusive right to its Su-
perStrip patents in North America and worldwide. Knogo
would, however, continue to use its SuperStrip technology within
North America. Finally, the parties agreed to grant each other
royalty-free cross-licenses, in which each firm agreed to tell the
other of any improvements either may make to the SuperStrip
technology.
Thus, the "successor corporation to Knogo's business,"102
would continue to do business in North America. Sensormatic,
however, did not acquire Knogo's North American business. 103
Accordingly, Tom and Newberg inaccurately described the case
when they spoke of "Sensormatic's acquisition of Knogo."'104 For
all practical purposes, Knogo 105 and Sensormatic simply entered
into a cross-licensing agreement 106 regarding North America. 107
101 See Tom & Newberg, supra note 6, at 224-25.
102 See Sensormatic Elec. Corp., 60 Fed. Reg. 5428, 5429 (1995).
103 See id. at 5430-31 (indicating Sensormatic acquired all of Knogos assets outside of
North America); see also Bryan R. Dunlap, A Practical Guide to Innovation Markets, 9
ANTITRUST 21, 26 (1995) (discussing Sensormatic merger).
104 See Tom & Newberg, supra note 6, at 224; see also Chin, supra note 43, at 120.
105 See Sensormatic Elec. Corp., 60 Fed. Reg. at 5430. Technically, Sensormatic was
Knogo's successor corporation. Id.
106 See Sensormatic Elec. Corp., 60 Fed. Reg. at 5430 (indicating merger obligated
them to grant cross-licenses to each other).
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The FTC essentially analyzed the Knogo-Sensormatic licensing
agreement. The FTC found that this licensing agreement would
affect the future goods market for the next generation of anti-
shoplifting equipment. The complaint defined this future goods
market rather awkwardly.
c) FTC Did Not Find an Innovation Market
(1) Awkward Market Definition
The complaint defined the relevant market as that for the
"research and development of disposable labels developed or
used for source labeling and the research and development of
processes to manufacturer disposable labels."108 "Disposable la-
bels" and "source labels" are the terms the complaint used to de-
scribe the next generation of anti-shoplifting equipment. 109
The complaint defined the market rather awkwardly. The
complaint did not define the relevant market as the future mar-
ket for the relevant product. Rather, the complaint defined the
relevant market as the market for research and development to
develop disposable labels or source labels. Since disposable la-
bels and source labels are the next generation of anti-shoplifting
equipment, the complaint effectively defined the relevant market
as the market for the research and development of the next gen-
eration of anti-shoplifting equipment.
The FTC appeared to be drafting its complaint in a manner
compatible with Gilbert and Sunshine's innovation market
methodology. 110 But just as Gilbert and Sunshine's innovation
107 See High-Tech Global Marketplace, supra note 10, at 791. The FTC staff also in-
accurately referred to this as a merger case. Id.
108 See Sensormatic Elec. Corp., 60 Fed. Reg. at 5430; see also Kevin J. Arquit &
Richard Wolfram, Mergers and Acquisitions: U.S. Antitrust Analysis and Enforcement, in
38 T ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW INSTITUTE, 459, at 552 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 1049, 1998) (explaining thought process which comprised FTC
market definition); Chin, supra note 43, at 127 (noting substance of FTC's complaint re-
garding market).
109 See Sensormatic Elec. Corp., 60 Fed. Reg. at 5430. "Disposable labels, says the
complaint, are "labels affixed to or embedded in retail merchandise and used in conjunc-
tion with hard goods EAS systems." Id. The Complaint says that "source labeling means
the process by which manufacturers, packagers, or independent wholesalers apply dis-
posable labels to retail merchandise or its packaging." Id.
110 See Andrew Chin, supra note 43, at 135 (discussing Gilbert and Sunshines inno-
vation market approach); see also Jonathan Baker, Fringe Firms and Incentives to Inno-
vate, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 621, 639-41 (1995) (discussing market structure and industry
innovation).
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market methodology only defined a future goods markets, the
compliant in this case only defined a future goods market in this
case.
The complaint defined programs that were both trying to de-
velop the same future product as competing research programs.
Thus, just as the first step of Gilbert and Sunshine's innovation
market methodology can only define, as competing R&D, R&D
relating to the same specific future product, 111 so too can the
complaint in this case only define competing R&D as R&D relat-
ing to the same specific future product.
In this case the FTC found that the relevant research pro-
grams competed against each other only because it also found
that both research programs were trying to develop the same
specific future product. Thus, the FTC anticipated that if the
relevant firms did not enter into their transaction, then they
would probably compete against each other in the future. The
FTC, therefore, saw that this transaction may raise antitrust
problems in the relevant future goods market. Consequently,
the FTC actually regulated competition in the relevant future
goods market.
In many cases the FTC has alleged that the relevant firms
competed in the market for "research, development, manufacture
and sale of [a product]. 112 In this case the FTC only alleged that
the firms competed in the market for "research and develop-
ment." It does not follow, however, that simply because the FTC
took the words "manufacture and sale" out of its complaint, that
it therefore found an innovation market. In fact, the more logi-
cal conclusion is the FTC should have included the words
"manufacture and sale" in its complaint.
(2) Anticompetitive Use of Patents and Standards
The FTC feared that the parties' licensing agreement would
harm competition in two ways. First, the FTC feared that the
cross-licensing provision would lower the firms' incentive to in-
111 See Taylor & Carswell, supra note 43, at 55 (summarizing Gilbert & Sunshine's
five step approach).
112 See, e.g., Upjohn Co., 60 Fed. Reg. 56153, 56153 (1995). See generally Ann
Bingaman, Antitrust and Innovation in a High Technology Society, Address at the Cele-
bration of the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of the Antitrust Division, Jan. 10, 1994,
reprinted in 7 Trade Reg. (CCH) 150, 128 at 48, 998.
THE INNOVATION M4RKETMYTH
novate. 113 Second, the FTC feared that the parties' agreement
would allow them to develop standards that they could use to
keep other firms out of the relevant market. The FTC, however,
could respond to both of these competitive concerns without
finding an innovation market.
Regarding the cross-licensing agreement, it does not follow
that simply because the FTC found that the firms improperly
agreed to tell each other of improvements either may make to
the SuperStrip technology, that the FTC therefore found an in-
novation market. The FTC has occasionally found that cross-
licensing provisions improperly lower firms' incentive to inno-
vate. The FTC certainly has the authority to make such a find-
ing, 114 and can do so without finding an innovation market.
Regarding the development of standards, 115 the FTC appar-
ently feared that if these two firms worked together, then they
could develop the standard which would allow manufacturers'
markers and retailers' sensors to work together. Since the next
generation system would allow manufacturers to directly imbed
the marker that would activate retailers' sensors into their
products, manufacturers and retailers must use compatible
markers and sensors.
The FTC feared that, after developing this standard, Knogo
and Sensormatic could use their control of this standard to im-
properly exclude other firms from the future goods market. 116
113 See Sensormatic Elec. Corp., 60 Fed. Reg.at 5430. The complaint alleges that the
transaction would lower only Knogo's incentive to innovate. Id. The complaint does not
allege that the transaction would lower Sensormatic's incentive to innovate. Id. The ar-
ticle, however, assumes that the FTC feared that the agreement would lower each firm's
incentive to innovate. Id.; see also Landman, supra note 42, at 777 (discussing how
agencies found future goods markets); Rapp, supra note 45, at 77 (summarizing cross-
license provision of Sensormatic merger).
114 See, e.g., I.P. Guidelines, supra note 42, at § 5.4.
115 See Dahdouh & Mongoven, supra note 1, at 426-27. The complaint in this case
does not allege that the parties' agreement would allow them to develop, and improperly
use, this standard. Id. Several FTC officials have, however, claimed that in this case the
FTC did indeed fear that the firms would use this standard improperly. Id. When Tom
and Newberg explain this case they certainly do not contradict what these other FTC of-
ficials have said. Id. In fact, they seem to support their colleagues. Id. This article, there-
fore, assumes that the FTC did indeed fear that the firms would improperly develop and
apply this standard. Id. The article shows that even if the FTC did act to stop the firms
from improperly applying this standard, it did so without finding an innovation market.
Id.; see also Landman, supra note 42, at 756 (regarding agencies discovery of future
goods markets instead of innovation markets); Tom & Newberg, supra note 6, at 224-25
(examining Sensormatic merger); Varney, supra note 34, at 189 (discussing collusion in
innovation markets).
116 See Sensormatic Elec. Corp., 60 Fed. Reg. at 5430. The complaint actually only
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The FTC, of course, stopped these firms from improperly exclud-
ing other firms from the market. Therefore, the FTC acted to
regulate how the firms were developing the appropriate standard
in this case. But the agencies often regulate how firms develop
standards. 1 17 To do this the FTC, once again, need not have
found an innovation market.
d) FTC Acknowledges That in This Case it Did Not Find an
Innovation Market
(1) "High-Tech Global Marketplace"
In two separate passages in its report on the "High-Tech
Global Marketplace," 118 the FTC staff acknowledged that the
FTC found a future goods market rather than an innovation
market. The FTC staff acknowledged this, firstly, in the passage
quoted supra in which the FTC staff acknowledged that when it
analyzes these so-called innovation market cases it actually pro-
tects competition in "ultimate goods markets." The FTC, how-
ever, decided this case before it issued this report. The FTC staff
was well aware of this case when it made this acknowledgement.
In another passage, the FTC staff acknowledged for the second
time that the FTC had found a future goods market in this case.
In its introduction to the section of the report in which it dis-
cussed Sensormatic and related cases, the FTC report specifi-
cally stated: "Each innovation effort was directed toward devel-
opment of a specific product."1 19 The FTC staff was correct. But
alleges that the transaction would "decreas[e] the number of research and development
tracks for disposable labels to be designed or used for source labeling." Id. However,
other authorities have made it clear that in this case the FTC feared that the transaction
would allow the firms to develop the appropriate standards, and to then anticompeti-
tively block access to the relevant market. Id.; see also High-Tech Global Marketplace,
supra note 10, at 798 (indicating agencies should apply scrutiny to effects of conduct on
standards); Dahdouh & Mongoven, supra note 1, at 427 (examining possible effects of
collusion in developing standard); Landman, supra note 42, at 721 (discussing innovation
markets).
117 See James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Standard-Setting Consortia, Antitrust, and
High-Technology Industries, 64 ANTITRUST L. J. 247, 249 (1995) (explaining effects of
standards in antitrust cases); see also Cohen, supra note 10, at 568-69 (discussing impli-
cations of standards). See generally Dahdouh & Mongoven, supra note 1, at 407 (1996)
(summarizing FTC standards and giving historical perspective on innovation markets).
118 See High-Tech Global Marketplace, supra note 10, at 791; see also Bryan Gruley,
FTC to Weigh Cost Savings in Mergers, WALL ST. J., June 3, 1996, at A3 (discussing cost
savings antitrust analysis).
119 See High-Tech Global Marketplace, supra note 10, at 794.
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since each innovation effort was directed toward development of
a specific product, the agencies actually regulated the future
markets for these specific products. Thus, as the report implic-
itly acknowledged, the FTC actually regulated Knogo and Sen-
sormatic's competition in the future goods market for the next
generation of anti-shoplifting equipment.
(2) Commissioner Azcuenaga
FTC Commissioner Azcuenaga agreed with the FTC staff re-
port. She has also acknowledged that the FTC analyzed a future
goods market in this case. In fact, the Commissioner acknowl-
edged not only that the FTC found a future goods market, but
also that existing law already gave the Commission all the
authority it needed to act in this case. According to Commis-
sioner Azcuenaga, the FTC did not need to, and did not, find an
innovation market to take necessary action in this case.
(a) FTC Found a Future Goods Market
Commissioner Azcuenaga certainly believed that the FTC
found a future goods markets, not a innovation market. Since
Sensormatic was decided, Commissioner Azcuenaga has reiter-
ated this point in three speeches. In a speech quoted at length
previously, the Commissioner said the criticism of the innovation
market approach does not "undercut our antitrust concerns for
future competition in a specific product."'120 In another speech,
which the Commissioner, she said that the FTC is "continuing to
allege a diminution of competition in research and development
markets for specific products."'121
The Commissioner also repeated this acknowledgment in yet a
third speech. 122 In this speech Commissioner Azcuenaga dis-
120 See Azcuenaga, supra note 67.
121 See Azcuenaga, supra note 68.
122 See Mary L. Azcuenaga, Speech Before the American Law Institute-American
Bar Association AntitrustIntellectual Property Claims in High Technology Markets, Jan.
25, 1996. In this speech the Commissioner actually made many of the same points as
does this article. Her remarks are therefore worth quoting at length. In this speech the
Commissioner said that:
Much of the criticism of research and development markets appears to be based on
the incorrect perception that the Commission is evaluating competition in pure re-
search among laboratories, but this is not the case. I think that I and perhaps others
have been remiss in the past by accepting and using the terms "innovation markets"
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cussed Sensormatic in quite some detail. And in the speech the
Commission acknowledged that the FTC protects competition in
future goods markets. These three speeches, together, therefore
confirm Commissioner Azcuenaga's belief that the FTC protected
competition in a future goods market, not in an innovation mar-
ket, in Sensormatic.
(b) Existing Law Sufficient
Commissioner Azcuenaga also apparently believed that exist-
ing law authorized the FTC to act in Sensormatic. Contrary to
Ciba Geigy, the Commissioner did not claim that the FTC lacked
the requisite authority to order Knogo to grant Sensormatic only
a non-exclusive license to its SuperStrip technology. In fact, the
Commissioner issued a dissenting opinion in this case. The
Commissioner questioned other aspects of the FTC's decision. 123
But the Commissioner did not question the FTC's power to act in
this case. Thus, Commissioner Azcuenaga believed that tradi-
tional antitrust law already gave the FTC all the power it needed
and "research and development markets" without qualification. This may be the
source of a great deal of the confusion about and opposition to so-called innovation
markets or research and development markets. By definition, we cannot predict true
innovation. But that is not what our cases are about. Our casual use of the term
"research and development market" actually refers to cases that allege research and
development in a particular product that we have been able to define with some de-
gree of specificity and that can be foreseen with reasonable certainty. This is what I
have called the market for future products. Our "research and development" com-
plaints always contain a definition of research and development that is tied to a very
specific product market.
Analyzing a merger that involves a future product market is not very different
from analyzing one that involves a market for existing products. In the pharmaceuti-
cal industry, for example, when a market is defined as a product that is approaching
the end of development and regulatory review, the participants in the market are the
companies that have those product-specific research & development projects. In the
cases that the Commission has brought, only a small number of firms participated in
the market, and other firms that were likely to have the same research capabilities
lagged many years behind the market participants in the specific product markets at
issue. Under these circumstances, it is easy to understand what the market is and to
see that the market is highly concentrated. In contrast, it may be much more diffi-
cult even to identify who is doing pure research in a field. Some chemist in China
may have just realized an incredible scientific breakthrough, the implications of
which could change an entire industry in the next ten years, and we may have no
way of knowing that. But we can find out which firms are working through the FDA
approval process for particular drugs.
Id.
123 See Sensormatic Elec. Corp., 60 Fed. Reg. 5428, 5428 (1995). The Commissioner
dissented because, she said, the FTC had defined both the product market and the geo-
graphic market too narrowly. Id.
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to regulate the future goods market found in this case. 124
Commissioner Azcuenaga did not believe that the FTC needed to
resort to the novel legal theory that the firms competed in an in-
novation market to issue its order.
e) Tom and Newberg: May Not Compete in Future Goods
Market
Tom and Newberg stated that, unlike in the pharmaceutical
cases, the FTC could not regulate the future goods market in this
case. The authors state that firms may never compete in a fu-
ture goods market; "it may be that only one of the two research
paths would succeed, so that no future goods market competition
would be eliminated." 125
(1) Does Not Justify Finding Innovation Market
Whenever the agencies protect competition in a future goods
market, they protect competition that may never arise. It is al-
ways possible that one or more of the firms investing in the rele-
vant R&D will not actually develop the products they are trying
to develop. Thus, the FTC should not regulate all possible future
goods markets. The FTC should only regulate those future goods
markets in which the relevant firms are likely to compete.
By and large, the agencies have only regulated future goods
markets in which the relevant firms were indeed likely to com-
pete. 126 If Tom and Newberge were correct in stating that in
this case "only one of the two research paths would succeed, so
that no future goods market competition would be elimi-
nated,"'127 then the firms were not likely to compete in a future
goods market. On the other hand, perhaps a little more accu-
rately, the firms may not have been likely enough to compete in
a future goods market for the FTC to have regulated this mar-
124 In fact, the Commissioner's support for the general idea that the FTC finds fu-
ture goods markets indicates that she believes that currently existing law, such as the
potential competition doctrine, gives the FTC all the authority it needs to act in all these
cases, except, of course, in Ciba Geigy.
125 See Tom & Newberg, supra note 6, at 225.
126 See generally Taylor & Carswell, supra note 43, at 63 (regulating competing
firms).
127 See id.
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ket. If this were the case, then the FTC should perhaps have not
regulated the firms' competition in the future goods market.
Tom and Newberg imply, however, that if the firms were not
likely to compete in a future goods market, then, rather than not
regulate this transaction at all, the FTC should instead have
used innovation market methodology to regulate this transac-
tion. This not a reasonable suggestion. If the firms were not
likely to compete in the future goods market, then the FTC
should not have regulated the firms' possible competition in the
future goods market. The FTC should most certainly not, for
this reason alone, instead regulate the firms' theoretical compe-
tition in an innovation market.
(2) Can Not Find Innovation Market Simply Because No
Future Goods Markets
Tom and Newberg imply that, since the FTC could not regu-
late the firms' competition in the future goods market, it should
have instead regulated the firms' competition in the related in-
novation market. But the agencies should only find an innova-
tion market if they are able to apply the appropriate methodol-
ogy; they should never find an innovation market simply because
they cannot regulate competition in a related future goods mar-
ket.
In this case, the FTC could not find an innovation market be-
cause it could not apply the Gilbert and Sunshine's most devel-
oped innovation market methodology. In this case, for example,
the FTC could not apply the first step of Gilbert and Sunshine's
methodology. As discussed supra, the complaint actually de-
fined, not a market in which "innovation" was the product, but
rather one in which the relevant product was a product both
firms were trying to develop.
The FTC could also not satisfy the fourth step of Gilbert and
Sunshine methodology. In this case the FTC could not properly
analyze the firms' incentives to innovate. In fact, the FTC's con-
cerns in this case lead to inconsistent conclusions regarding the
firms' incentives to innovate. One the one hand, the FTC feared
that the firms would develop standards that would allow them to
keep others out of the relevant market. The FTC, therefore,
implicitly believed that the firms would face a strong incentive to
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innovate. If the firms developed these standards, and excluded
others from the market, then the firms could earn monopoly
rents.
On the other hand, the FTC also feared that the cross-
licensing provision would lower the firms' incentives to innovate.
The FTC's analysis, therefore, demonstrated its belief that this
transaction would both increase and decrease the firms' incen-
tives to innovate. As a result, the FTC could not apply the fourth
step of Gilbert and Sunshine's innovation market methodology.
Therefore, it could not find an innovation market in this case. 128
3. GM/ZF
a) Issue is Jurisdiction
In this case, the DOJ assumed jurisdiction over the broad cur-
rent goods market for heavy-duty automatic transmissions. In
the United States, General Motors and ZF Friedrichshafen com-
peted not in this broad current market, but in two narrow cur-
rent markets. The firms competed in the broad market only in
Europe. The DOJ, however, used the innovation market concept
to essentially assume jurisdiction over the broad European
heavy-duty automatic transmission market.
Tom and Newberg believe that the DOJ acted appropriately in
this case. The DOJ acted correctly because the agency could not
allow the world's two leading manufactures of heavy-duty auto-
matic transmissions to combine their businesses. If it had done
so, then American consumers would have suffered because the
transaction would have forced them to buy transmissions of
poorer quality than they would otherwise have been able to buy.
129
b) Regulatory Anarchy
Contrary to Tom and Newberg's opinion, however, the DOJ
should not have assumed jurisdiction in this case. Firms
throughout the world compete, not only on price, but also on
128 See Landman, supra note 42, at 756. For a more detailed analysis showing that
the FTC could not apply Gilbert and Sunshine innovation market methodology to this
case. Id.
129 See Tom & Newberg, supra note 6, at 225-26 (discussing effects of merger be-
tween GM's Allison division and ZE Friedrichshafen).
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quality, features, and innovation. If two firms in any part of the
world combine their businesses, their transaction may very well
affect firms and customers located in other parts of the world.
The transaction may, in particular, lessen the competitive pres-
sure on other firms to innovate. These other firms may be in any
part of the world.
Antitrust authorities throughout the world, however, cannot
assert jurisdiction over any transaction that may lessen the
competitive pressure to innovate on firms located within their
jurisdiction. If the authorities did so, then all antitrust authori-
ties throughout the world could assert jurisdiction over just
about all transactions. Regulatory anarchy would rule.
c) Jurisdiction in Europe
In this case, the firms competed in the broad heavy-duty
automatic transmission market in Europe. Thus, the appropri-
ate European antitrust authority, and not the United States
DOJ, should have assumed jurisdiction over this transaction.
Further, this European authority would have been very reluc-
tant to allow Europe, and the world's, only two major heavy-duty
automatic transmission manufacturers of combine their busi-
nesses. Thus, while responding to its own legitimate concerns
regarding the current goods market, this authority would also
have responded to the DOJ's concerns regarding the future goods
market and the firms' competition to innovate.
C. Tom and Newberg Cannot Identify "Next Generation"of
Product
1. No Clear Line Divides "New" From "Next Generation"
Products
Tom and Newberg imply that the agencies should have found
innovation markets in all three of these cases because the agen-
cies should find innovation market in cases in which "the con-
tours of the next generation product are not completely clear are
harder to analyze without the innovation market concept. ' 130
But Tom and Newberg cannot apply this test. These authors
130 See id. at 224.
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have great difficulty distinguishing between truly "new" products
and other products, which, although new, these authors consider
merely "next generation" products.
Most firms develop products that, while "new," are actually
improved versions of products already being sold by these firms.
No clear line divides these "next generation" products from truly
"new" products. For example, the authors say that the FTC
could have analyzed Glaxo/Wellcome without finding an innova-
tion market. 131  The authors therefore believe that in
Glaxo/Wellcome the FTC analyzed a truly "new" product, and
not the next generation of a product. In that case Glaxo and
Wellcome competed in the future goods market to develop the
oral form of the antimigrane drug, which did not exist yet. Since
Glaxo already sold an injectable form of the drug, the firms' joint
effort to develop an oral form of the drug was viewed as an im-
provement on the drug Glaxo already sold. They were, therefore,
actually trying to develop the next generation of the product.
Similarly, although Tom and Newberg believe that the FTC
could analyze Baxter without finding an innovation market, the
FTC seems to have analyzed, not a "new" product, but rather the
next generation of an already existing product in this case as
well. Here, both firms were trying to develop fibrin sealants that
could be sold in the United States. No firm yet sold fibrin seal-
ants in the United States, but firms did sell fibrin sealants in
Japan and Europe. 132 Thus, the product the firms were trying
to develop and sell in the United States was presumably an im-
proved version of the fibrin sealants firms already sold in other
countries. Thus, in this case as well, the firms were trying to
develop the next generation of the product.
2. Tom and Newberg Methodology Unworkable
Tom and Newberg imply that the agencies should use both in-
novation market methodology and what these authors call ex-
panded potential competition analysis. According to these
authors, the agencies should first determine whether the rele-
vant firms are trying to develop a truly "new" product, or merely
the next generation of an already existing product. If the rele-
131 See Glaxo plc., 60 Fed. Reg. 16139, 16140-41 (1995).
132 See Baxter Int'l Inc., 62 Fed. Reg. 408, 408 (1997) (discussing fibrin sealant case).
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vant firms are trying to develop an entirely new product, then
the agencies should apply what the authors call "expanded po-
tential competition analysis." But if the relevant firms are try-
ing to develop the next generation of an already existing product,
then the agencies should apply innovation market methodology.
However, as the preceding examples have shown, Tom and
Newberg were unable to distinguish between "new" and next
generation products. Firms develop products that are, to varying
degrees, "new." No clear line divides "new" from merely "next
generation" products. So, if Tom and Newberg are not able to
distinguish between "new" and "next generation" products, then
the agencies will also not be able to do so. The agencies will not
be able to determine if products, which do not even exist yet, are
"new" or "next generation" products.
While the agencies cannot find innovation markets in cases in-
volving the next generation of a product as Tom and Newberg
would have them do, they need not do so. As one writer has said:
Where the innovation is evolutionary rather than revolu-
tionary, so that the product being traded in the future is
simply a more advanced version of the product being traded
today or where the innovation is aimed at improving the
process for producing an existing product, I see no reason
why the traditional antitrust analysis is inadequate to do
the job [of protecting competition]. 133
VII. MICROSOFT/INTUIT AND OTHER CASES
Tom and Newberg do not say that the cases they mention are
the only cases in which the FTC found, or may have found, inno-
vation markets. Other writers have suggested that the agencies
found innovation markets in other cases. In particular, Richard
Lande and Sturgis Sobin have suggested that in other cases not
discussed in this article, the agencies have found innovation
markets. 134 Stewart Pomerantz have also made similar sugges-
133 See Hay, supra note 7, at 14.
134 See Robert H. Lande & Sturgis M. Sobin, Symposium: High Technology, Antitrust
& The Regulation of Competition, Reverse Engineering of Computer Software and U. S.
Antitrust Law, 9 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 237, 255 (1996) (finding U.S. government sought to
prevent acquisitions in innovation markets); Azcuenaga, supra note 67 (finding innova-
tion market in American Home Products case although commission did not so call it).
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tions. 135  Of these cases, the most prominent 136 is Micro-
soft/Intuit. 137
A. Microsoft/Intuit
1. Facts
Lande and Sobin say that this case is "an example of an in-
stance where an innovation market is relevant to antitrust
analysis."'138 Here, the DOJ would not allow Microsoft to buy its
software rival, Intuit. Intuit made and sold Quicken, the world's
leading personal finance software. Microsoft sold Microsoft
Money, Quicken's main competitor. Obviously aware of the
DOJ's antitrust concerns, Microsoft planned not only to buy In-
tuit, but also to transfer the "code" of Microsoft Money, and re-
lated intellectual property, to a competitor, Novell. Microsoft,
however, intended to integrate the Intuit employees who devel-
oped Quicken into its own personal finance software business.
2. Lande and Sobin: Microsoft May Not Control Employees
Lande and Sobin say that the DOJ did not approve this trans-
action because it would not allow Intuit's software developers to
join forces with Microsoft. While these authors are correct, they
overemphasize this aspect of this complex transaction.
In agreement with Lande and Sobin, the DOJ did feel that In-
tuit's employees rather than its intellectual property gave Intuit
its competitive advantage. The DOJ therefore believed that if
Microsoft took control of these employees, it would be able to in-
corporate Intuit's main competitive strength into its business.
Further, the DOJ also felt that Novell could not adequately com-
135 See Stewart A. Pomerantz, A Lawyers Ramble Down the Information Superhigh-
way: Recent Antitrust Developments and a Selective Antitrust Perspective on the Informa-
tion Superhighway, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 808, 835 (1995) (stating how firm's conduct may
allow it to fall within definition of innovation markets).
136 See Why Bill Gates Should Worry, supra note 15, at 106 (stating FTC has deter-
mined that in technology industries innovation is as important as price).
137 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding
entry of antitrust consent decree was in best interest of public).
138 See Lande & Sobin, supra note 134, at 255 (arguing Microsoft's proposed acquisi-
tion of Intuit is one example of antitrust analysis); see also Jay Dratler, Jr., Microsoft as
an Antitrust Target: IBM in Software?, 25 Sw. U. L. REV. 671, 672 (1996) (stating that
Microsoft is target of antitrust analysis).
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pete against Microsoft. 139 After its acquisition of Intuit, Micro-
soft would not only be a very effective competitor, but it only in-
tended to transfer to Novell its own, presumably inferior, intel-
lectual property. Thus, the DOJ would not allow Microsoft to
buy Intuit.
3. Other Barriers to Entry: Installed Customer Base
a) Intuit's Extensive Base of Customers
But these authors overemphasize the significance that the
DOJ placed on the opportunity this transaction gave Microsoft to
exploit the skills of Intuit's software developers. The authors
acknowledge that the DOJ opposed this transaction only "partly"
because it did not want Microsoft to control Intuit's employees.
The authors do not explain, however, the other reasons why the
DOJ opposed this transaction.
In this case, the DOJ believed that Intuit competed so effec-
tively because it had developed such a highly skilled team of
software developers and because it had developed such a large
base of Quicken customers. The DOJ's complaint clearly indi-
cated that it considered one of Intuit's primary competitive
strengths to be this large base of customers. 140 This large base
allowed Intuit to generate a steady stream of revenue as it con-
tinued to sell to these customers upgrades of its Quicken soft-
ware. The DOJ concluded that this revenue stream would allow
the owner of Quicken, be it Intuit or Microsoft, to finance its
R&D to develop even better software. By continuing to develop
better software, Quicken's owner would be able to continuously
sell a product so superior that it would dominate its market.
The DOJ also felt that Intuit's installed base of customers gave
it a considerable competitive advantage in other ways as well.
For example, the installed customer base gave Intuit a reputa-
tion for quality and reliability that encouraged yet more consum-
ers to purchase Quicken. 141 Thus, the DOJ concluded that In-
139 See Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d at 1448 (explaining transfer to Novell of some Micro-
soft assets would not enhance Novell's ability to compete); see also Lande & Sobin, supra
note 134, at 255, n.63 (noting transfer would not include any human resources).
140 See Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d at 1448 (articulating idea that Intuit's database was
well-established and major strength).
141 See id. (finding most customers purchase software technology based on reputa-
tion); see also Lande & Sobin, supra note 134, at 255 n.63 (elaborating on Microsoft de-
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tuit's customer base gave it a very significant competitive advan-
tage. This customer base created a barrier to entry that Intuit's
competitors would have great difficulty overcoming. 142
b) With Intuit's Customer Base, Microsoft Could Monopolize
the Market
In its complaint, the DOJ also discussed Microsoft's consider-
able abilities to compete in the general personal computer soft-
ware market. 143 The DOJ concluded that Microsoft was the only
firm that could seriously challenge Intuit's leading position in
the personal finance software market. DOJ feared that if Micro-
soft, instead of competing against Intuit, combined its consider-
able ability to compete in the general market with Intuit's ability
to compete in the personal finance market, then it would create a
business against which no other firm could compete.
Thus, the DOJ believed that Intuit competed so effectively be-
cause it had developed such highly skilled software developers
and because it had developed such an extensive base of Quicken
users. If Microsoft were able to incorporate these competitive ad-
vantages into its personal finance software business, and were
able to eliminate Intuit as a competitor, then, the DOJ con-
cluded, Microsoft would monopolize the personal finance soft-
ware market.
4. The DOJ Tried to Anticipate Future Market Development
In Microsoft/Intuit, the DOJ analyzed the personal finance
software market. It analyzed both the current and future mar-
kets for this specific product. The DOJ, however, did not find an
innovation market. The DOJ analyzed the current personal fi-
scription of Intuit personnel as most important asset it would acquire in merger).
142 See Cohen, supra note 10, at 536. The author put forth the idea that with increas-
ing returns, one technology ultimately wins the entire market & drives others out. Id.;
High-Tech Global Marketplace, supra note 10. The DOJ may also have feared that the
Intuit's large installed base of customers would have encouraged other, new customers,
to also purchase Quicken. Id. These new customers may have chosen to purchase
Quicken, not simply because the program had proven its reliability, but also because so
many other people used the program. Id. These new customers may have wanted to pur-
chase the same program which many other people used, so they could easily exchange
files with these other users. Id. This concern is a part of the agencies "new thinking." Id.
In this case, however, DOJ did not allege that such network effects created a barrier to
entry. Id.
143 See Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d at 1448 (explaining Microsoft's position as powerful
and successful competitor in software industry).
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nance software market quite extensively, and in fact concluded
that the current market participants were engaged in a "bloody
share war."144
In this case the DOJ also tried to anticipate the development
of the personal finance software market. It tried to determine
how this transaction would affect these developments. In par-
ticular, the DOJ analyzed how this transaction would affect the
market for software that allowed consumers to access their bank
accounts from their homes. This new software would allow con-
sumers to use their home computers to manage their financial
affairs in a much more complex manner than they could using
the then-current generation of personal finance software.
One could call this future personal finance software market ei-
ther the market for next-generation of the software, or a market
for an entirely new product. The DOJ, however, did not have to
make this distinction.145 The DOJ opposed this transaction be-
cause it felt that if Microsoft, with its already considerable
strengths in the general software market, acquired Quicken,
with its considerable strengths in the personal finance software
market, then Microsoft would be able to dominate the current
and future markets for personal finance software.
5. The DOJ Did Not Find an Innovation Market
This case raised very interesting questions. Lande and Sobin,
for example, queried whether the DOJ could stop a firm from
combining, not patents or other intellectual property rights, but
the employees who develop these patents and intellectual prop-
erty rights. The DOJ's analysis also raised other interesting
questions, particularly regarding if and how a product's exten-
sive base of customers created barriers to entry to current and
future markets.
Interesting though they may be, these questions do not relate
to innovation markets. Gilbert and Sunshine's innovation mar-
ket methodology will not help the agencies answer the interest-
ing questions this case raises. Lande and Sobin do not describe
any innovation market methodology that the DOJ may have
144 See id. (quoting Intuit's Chairman's opinion of likely merger effects).
145 This case shows, yet again, that the agencies can not distinguish between next
generation products and new products. The case also shows that Tom and Newberg offer
no logical reason why the agencies should make this distinction.
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used to find an innovation market. In short, DOJ raised many
interesting questions in this case, but it did not find an innova-
tion market.
B. Other Cases
Lande and Sobin list one other case, Silicon Graphics,146 in
which the agencies found an innovation market. Pomerantz
identified Silicon Graphics as one of three other cases in which
the agencies found innovation markets. The agencies did not
find an innovation market in this case.
1. Silicon Graphics
Lande and Sobin, 147 Pomerantz, 148 and an FTC Commis-
sioner 149 have said that in this case the FTC found an innovation
market. In this case the FTC reviewed Silicon Graphics' acqui-
sition of Alias Research, Inc. ("Alias"), and Wavefront Technolo-
gies, Inc ("Wavefront"). Alias and Wavefront were two of world's
three largest developers of entertainment graphics software.
Silicon Graphics made the powerful workstation computers that
operated the sophisticated software Alias and Wavefront pro-
duced.
Silicon Graphics therefore operated in a related, but different,
market from the one in which Wavefront and Alias competed;
Silicon Graphics competed in a vertically related market. There-
fore, the FTC used vertical foreclosure theory 150 to analyze this
transaction. It did not use Gilbert and Sunshine's innovation
market methodology.
146 See In re Silicon Graphics Inc., FTC File No. 951-0064 (1995).
147 See Lande & Sobin, supra note 134, at 255-56 (arguing FTC used innovation
market analysis in analyzing Silicon Graphics).
148 See Pomerantz, supra note 135, at 836, n.860 (stating FTC enforcement efforts in
Silicone Graphics are example of innovation market theory).
149 See Roscoe B. Starek, Innovation Markets in Merger Review Analysis: The FTC
Perspective, Remarks Before the Continuing Legal Education Seminar, Feb. 23, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 120855, at *1 (finding innovation market analysis is now officially
used by DOJ and FTC and was applied in Silicon Graphics); see also Hightech Global
Marketplace, supra note 10, at 791 (noting innovation market analysis provides one ap-
propriate framework in which to analyze mergers likely effects on competition although
not always appropriate).
150 See Silicon Graphics, FTC File No. 951-0064 (1995) (Commissioner Mary L.
Azquenaga's dissent) (stating commission reliance on vertical foreclosure theory to im-
pose requirements might be inefficient).
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2. Oerlikon-Burhle Holding' 5 '
In this case, the FTC analyzed Oerlikon-Buhrle Holding's pur-
chase of Leybold AG. The FTC found antitrust problems in the
markets for turbomolecular pumps and compact disc metallizers.
Both firms already competed in both of these markets. The
firms, therefore, competed in current goods markets.
The FTC alleged, however, that because the acquisition would
allow the combined firm to monopolize the market, the firms
would not innovate as quickly as they otherwise would. But the
agencies always stop firms from monopolizing markets in part
because they believe that if the firm monopolizes the market,
then it will not innovate as well as it otherwise would have. And
to stop a firm from monopolizing a market the agencies do not
need to find an innovation market. 152 In this case, therefore, the
FTC acted to stop a firm from monopolizing a market without
finding an innovation market.
3. Adobe Systems 153
In Adobe Systems, the FTC analyzed the market for
"professional illustration software." In this case, therefore, the
FTC analyzed a very specific current goods market. The FTC
feared that the acquisition would allow the purchaser, Adobe
Systems, to monopolize this specific market. Again, the FTC al-
leged that the acquisition would allow the purchaser to monopo-
lize the relevant market. The FTC alleged that if the purchaser
obtained its monopoly, then it would not innovate. Nevertheless,
while the FTC should of course stop firms from obtaining mo-
nopolies, it can do so without finding innovation markets.
C. Lande and Sobin Skeptical of Innovation Markets
Although Lande and Sobin say that the DOJ found an innova-
tion market in both Silicon Graphics and Microsoft/Intuit, they
do not support the innovation market concept. These authors do
not believe that the agencies can actually apply innovation mar-
ket methodology:
151 See In re Oerlikon-Buhrle Holding AG., FTC File No. 941-0054 (Nov. 18, 1994).
152 See Landman, supra note 27, at 3.
153 See In re Adobe Systems Inc., FTC File No. 941-0059 (Aug. 5, 1994).
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"[DIespite the recent attention paid to both technology and
innovation markets, there are enormous practical difficulties
in the application of these concepts to real
cases .... Moreover, the concepts have yet to be applied rig-
orously and directly in any actual federal antitrust decision,
making it difficult to assess what role they are likely to
play .. ."154
This skepticism is well placed.
VIII. INNOVATION MARKETS AND THE AGENCIES' "NEW THINKING"
ON INNOVATION
A. Implementing "New Thinking" Without Finding Innovation
Markets
The agencies have not found innovation markets in any of
these cases. Instead, the agencies have preserved competition in
markets in which one or more of the relevant products did not
yet exist. Therefore, they have preserved competition in future
goods markets and in doing so, implemented their "new think-
ing" on innovation.
In several of these cases, however, the agencies have stopped
firms from using intellectual property rights or standards, to
anticompetitively block access to the relevant market. Thus,
while the agencies do implement their "new thinking" on inno-
vation when they protect competition in future goods markets,
these cases have allowed the agencies to implement other as-
pects their "new thinking." But as the agencies implemented
these other aspects of their "new thinking" in these cases, they
did so without finding an innovation market. This implies then
that the agencies can implement their "new thinking" on inno-
vation without finding innovation markets.
This section analyzed three significant cases in which the
agencies not only found future goods markets, but also imple-
mented other aspects of their "new thinking."
154 See Lande & Sobin, supra note 134, at 256 (discussing differences that could arise
from use of technology or innovation market, such as time frame within which to assess
competitive effects); see also Alvin R. Chin, The Misapplication of Innovation Market
Analysis to Biotechnology Mergers, 3 B.U. SC. & TECH. L.J. 6, 6 (1997) (proposing that
where there is uncertainty in defining relevant market, innovation market analysis may
be appropriate).
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1. Sensormatic
In Sensormatic, the FTC feared that if the relevant firms
combined their businesses as they originally planned, then they
would be able to develop, and impose on the market, the relevant
standard. Before they could use the next generation of anti-
shoplifting equipment, manufacturers and retailers would have
to agree on the standard electronic system they would use in
their markers and sensors. The FTC feared that if Knogo and
Sensormatic developed this standard, then they would use it to
keep other firms out of the market.
The FTC therefore feared that the firms would use this stan-
dard to improperly erect barriers to entry to the relevant market.
The FTC certainly should ensure that firms do not improperly
erect such barriers. In the last several years the FTC has ag-
gressively worked to eliminate barriers. It has done so as part of
its "new thinking" on innovation. 155 Thus in this case the FTC
implemented its "new thinking" on innovation without finding an
innovation market.
2. Microsoft/Intuit
In this case, the DOJ would not allow Microsoft to buy Intuit.
The DOJ feared that if Microsoft combined its considerable busi-
ness skills with Intuit's particular competitive advantages in the
market for personal finance software, then no firm would be able
to compete against Microsoft. In blocking this transaction DOJ
also implemented the agencies' "new thinking" on innovation,
but once again did so without finding an innovation market.
a) Software Developers Crucial Asset
The DOJ feared that, in two separate ways, this transaction
would harm competition. First, the DOJ feared that Microsoft
would become too strong a competitor if it took control of Intuit's
software developers. Microsoft originally intended to transfer to
Novell the intellectual property relating to its own personal fi-
nance software. Doing so, however, would not satisfy the DOd's
competitive concerns. The DOJ felt that these software develop-
ers gave Intuit a very significant competitive advantage. Thus,
155 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 10, at 556-57 (arguing that by precluding compatibil-
ity by setting standards competitor excludes rivals from competition).
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even if Microsoft transferred its intellectual property rights, it
would still retain the services of these software developers, and
would therefore still be able to monopolize the market, DOJ be-
lieved.
In this case, therefore, the DOJ enforced the antitrust and in-
tellectual property laws in an aggressive and very unusual
manner. By doing so it implemented its "new thinking" on inno-
vation without finding an innovation market.
b) Installed Base of Customers as Barrier to Entry
The DOJ also opposed this transaction because it did not want
Microsoft to gain access to the large base of customers Intuit had
developed. The DOJ believed that this large customer base also
gave Intuit a substantial competitive advantage. This customer
base allowed Intuit to earn a steady stream of revenue, as it sold
these customers Quicken upgrades. Intuit could then use this
revenue stream to finance yet more Quicken upgrades. In this
way, the DOJ concluded, Intuit would always be able to sell a
product wherein other firms would have great difficulty compet-
ing.
The DOJ felt that if Microsoft, with its already considerable
competitive strengths, was able to control this revenue stream,
then no other firm would be able to compete against Microsoft.
No firm could develop personal finance software which could
compete against a Quicken that Microsoft continuously im-
proved. Thus, the DOJ concluded, this transaction would allow
Microsoft to monopolize the relevant market.
Again, the DOJ enforced the antitrust laws in a unique, and
aggressive, manner. It stopped Microsoft from erecting barriers
to entry which it believed no firm could surmount. Once again,
as it did so, the DOJ implemented its "new thinking" on innova-
tion without finding an innovation market.
3. Ciba Geigy/Sandoz
In Ciba Geigy/Sandoz, the FTC also implemented its new
thinking on innovation, and, once again, did so without finding
an innovation market. In this case the FTC protected competi-
tion in four future goods markets. It also stopped Novartis from
improperly erecting barriers to entry to the future, broad, gene
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therapy market.
In this case the FTC would not let the merged firm, Novartis,
retain sole control of, among other intellectual property rights,
the so-called Anderson patent. The FTC feared that if Novartis
retained sole control of this very broad patent, then it would be
able to block access to the broad gene therapy market. To de-
velop gene therapy products Novartis' competitors would need to
use technology included within this broad patent. The FTC
feared that if Novartis controlled this broad patent, while also
controlling so many other intellectual property rights that firms
must also use to develop gene therapy products, then it would be
able to stop other firms from developing gene therapy products.
It would be able to block access to the future gene therapy mar-
ket. The FTC therefore ordered Novartis to license the Anderson
patent and other intellectual property.
In this case the FTC expanded its authority to regulate the
process by which firms acquired and combined intellectual prop-
erty rights. The FTC required Novartis to license the Anderson
patent even though, before the merger, Sandoz alone owned this
patent. The FTC therefore required Novartis to license the pat-
ent even though the merging firms did not combine intellectual
property rights to create this broad patent. The FTC expanded
the law regulating the acquisition and combination of intellec-
tual property rights by issuing this order.
Commissioner Azcuenaga dissented from the FTC decision in
this case exactly because she did not believe that the law
authorized the FTC to require Novartis to license the Andersen
patent. By rejecting Commissioner Azcuenaga's argument, the
other FTC Commissioners therefore clearly enforced the anti-
trust laws very aggressively. In doing so, these Commissioners
implemented their "new thinking" on innovation. But, once
again, they did so without finding an innovation market.
4. Conclusion
In all these cases, the agencies implemented important aspects
of their "new thinking" on innovation. And in all these cases the
agencies did so without finding an innovation market. In these
cases the agencies regulated future goods markets, and also
regulated the relevant firms' attempts to erect barriers to entry
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to these future goods markets. In these case the agencies feared
that the relevant firms were improperly erecting barriers to en-
try, and the agencies therefore stopped the firms from erecting
these barriers.
By preventing these firms from erecting barriers to entry, the
agencies implemented important aspects of their "new thinking"
on innovation. In the last several years the agencies have stud-
ied, in great detail, how market imperfections such as a large
customer base, or the market's need to develop standards, may
lessen the pressure on firms to innovate. These studies have led
the agencies to develop "new thinking" regarding how they can
enforce the antitrust and intellectual property laws to correct for
these market imperfections.
In the three cases this section analyzed the agencies have in-
deed tried to correct for these market imperfections. In these
cases the agencies have enforced the antitrust and intellectual
property laws in ways which, the agencies hope, will lower barri-
ers to entry and increase pressure to innovate. But the agencies
have done this without finding an innovation market.
Commissioner Azcuenaga probably had this "new thing" in
mind when she raised the possibility that the FTC found an in-
novation market in Ciba Geigy. The Commissioner said that the
FTC may have found an innovation market in this case "because
the complaint allege[d] increased barriers to entry and altered
incentives to license patents."156 The Commissioner correctly
implied that when trying to lower barriers to entry in this case
the FTC was implementing its "new thinking" on innovation.
The Commissioner should not have suggested, however, that the
implementation of its "new thinking" required the FTC to find an
innovation market. 157
156 See Azcuenaga, supra note 67 (quoting Commissioner's mention of complaint al-
leged in Ciba-Geigy); see also William J. Baer, New Myths and Old Realities: Perspec-
tives on Recent Developments in Antitrust Enforcement, Remarks Before the Bar Asso-
ciation of the City of New York (Nov. 16, 1997), available in 1997 WL 728608, at *5
(discussing how Ciba Geigy/Sandoz merger would have diminished incentives and ability
of other firms to develop competing products); FTC Accord in Ciba Geigy and Sandoz
Merger to Prevent Slow Down in Gene Therapy Development and Preserve Competition in
Corn Herbicides, Flea Control Markets, available in 1996 WL 721688, at *2 (stating No-
vartis would be required to grant licenses to any entity requesting one).
157 See Azcuenaga, supra note 68 (noting that Commission has applied innovation
market theory to benefit consumers).
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IX. TOM AND NEWBERG OVERLY ExPAND ANALYSIS
A. Tom and Newberg Call For Broad Expansion of Analysis
Tom and Newberg imply that the agencies should broaden
their analysis beyond simply evaluating competition in future
goods markets. To analyze competition in future goods market
the agencies apply the "potential competition doctrine." 158 Tom
and Newberg believe that the agencies should expand this doc-
trine so they can analyze more than just future goods markets.
The authors say:
One might want to make further adjustments [to the poten-
tial competition doctrine] in order to capture innovation ef-
fects in those markets (i.e. the elimination of the competition
to develop the drugs, not just the competition between the
drugs once developed and approved), but one would not nec-
essarily need the concept of innovation markets if one pre-
ferred instead to expand modestly the scope of the potential
competition doctrine. 159
When Tom and Newberg say that the agencies should analyze
innovation effects ("competition to develop the drugs") they, in
reality, say that the agencies should regulate competition beyond
competition in the future goods market (which is "competition
between the drugs once developed and approved"). The authors,
however, do not define these "innovation effects." 160
Because the authors do not define these "innovation effects,"
158 See, e.g., In re Roche Holdings Ltd., 113 F.T.C. 1086, 1086 (1990) (stating Com-
missioner has accepted consent agreement on doctrine of potential competition).
159 See Tom & Newberg, supra note 6, at 224 (noting difficulty in analysis of cases
involving competition to produce next-generation products absent innovation market
theory). [Emphasis in original]
160 See id. at 224 n.275. When Tom and Newberg refer to "innovation effects" they
may be referring to what one European Commission official has called "competition in
R&D." Id. If so, then Tom and Newberg may have made the same claim regarding the
American agencies that John Temple Lang seems to have made regarding the European
Commission. Id. Temple Lang has said that the European Commission regulates
"competition by two companies in R&D directed towards the same goal." Id. Temple Lang
therefore implies that the European Commission can regulate "competition in R&D" in
addition to regulating competition in a future goods market. Id. However, just as the
American authorities have regulated no more than future goods markets, so too has the
European Commission regulated no more than future goods markets. Id.; see also J.
Temple Lang, European Community Antitrust Law: Innovation Markets and High Tech-
nology Industries, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 717, 760-61 (1997). Dr. John Temple Lang is
the Director of the Directorate for Information, Communication and Multimedia of DG IV
of the European Commission. Id.
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they do not explain how they believe the agencies should regu-
late these effects. The authors do not, for example, explain the
methodology they believe the agencies should use, instead of in-
novation market methodology, to analyze these "innovation ef-
fects." Similarly, the authors do not explain how they would
"expand" the potential competition doctrine.
Tom and Newberg are certainly correct when they say that
firms compete, not only on price, but also to innovate. But the
authors are apparently unwilling to accept the reality that the
agencies can not regulate all forms of competition to innovate.
Tom and Newberg will not accept the reality that unless the
firms are likely competitors in a future goods market, then, the
"innovation effects" the firms' competition may generate, or,
what others have called the firms' "competition in R&D," is com-
petition in too abstract a sense for the agencies to have ever been
able to regulate.
B. Tom and Newberg Should Apply Porter's True Policy
Prescriptions
1. To Encourage Firms to Innovate, Porter Advocates
Aggressive Antitrust Enforcement
Instead of advocating that the agencies either find innovation
markets or analyze "innovation effects," Tom and Newberg
should simply accept that, to implement the economic policies
the agencies want to implement, they need only find future goods
markets. Tom and Newberg should recognize that when the
agencies protect competition in future goods markets they ac-
tually implement Porter's economic policy. In fact, by suggesting
that the agencies try to regulate these "innovation effects," the
authors are actually advocating that the agencies implement a
competition policy which goes beyond the policy Porter recom-
mends.
In The Competitive Advantage of Nations Porter recommends
that authorities vigorously enforce antitrust laws. If the
authorities ensure that markets are competitive, then, Porter
says, they will ensure that market forces drive firms to innovate.
If firms innovate, then, Porter concludes, they will make better
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products and will succeed in world markets. 161 Then Assistant
Attorney General for Antitrust, Anne Bingaman recognized this
when she cited The Competitive Advantage of Nations for the
ideas that "active domestic rivalry is strongly associated with in-
ternational success," and that "a strong antitrust policy, espe-
cially in the area of horizontal mergers, alliances and collusive
behavior, is essential to the role of upgrading any economy." 162
a) Porter Implicitly Supports Protecting Competition in
Future Goods Markets
Porter, therefore, supports the general idea that the authori-
ties should use the antitrust laws to encourage firms to innovate.
He does not, however, necessarily support the notion that the
agencies should find innovation markets. Nor does Porter neces-
sarily support the idea that the agencies should regulate what
Tom and Newberg call "innovation effects." In fact, when the
agencies protect competition in future goods markets they im-
plement Porter's policy prescriptions at least as much as when
they try to regulate "innovation effects," or when they try to
regulate competition in innovation markets.
When the agencies protect competition in future goods mar-
kets they are doing what Porter recommends in The Competitive
Advantage of Nations. They are enforcing the antitrust laws ag-
gressively. They are ensuring that market forces pressure firms
to innovate. 163 The agencies are therefore encouraging Ameri-
can firms to develop superior products, which they can then sell
on world markets. They are therefore using the antitrust laws,
just as Porter says they should, to enhance America's interna-
tional competitiveness.
When the agencies protect competition in future goods market
they are also doing what Porter recommends in the journal Anti-
trust. They are using the antitrust laws to promote, what Porter
then called "progressiveness." They are using the antitrust laws
to ensure that market forces drive firms to innovate. They do, as
Porter says they should, make fostering innovation the focus of
161 See Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 26, at 573 (discussing position that society
benefits from research and development); Dahdouh & Mongoven, supra note 1, at 408
(discussing idea that innovation accounts for large share of economic growth).
162 See Bingaman, supra note 21.
163 See Landman, supra note 27, at 3.
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antitrust enforcement.
As the agencies do this they, as Porter implies they should, ex-
pand the scope of the antitrust laws. While they do not expand
this doctrine as much as Tom and Newberg may like, they have
expanded it to the extent that in an important case that estab-
lished the precedent that the agencies can protect competition in
future goods markets, 164 one FTC Commissioner dissented be-
cause she believed the FTC had expanded the potential competi-
tion doctrine too far.165
Thus, when the agencies protect competition in future goods
markets they do everything they say they need innovation mar-
kets to do. They implement the economic policy Porter recom-
mends and they also expand the law and enforce it aggressively.
The agencies also encourage firms to innovate and, therefore,
implement their "new thinking" on innovation. They do all this
without finding an innovation market. The agencies, therefore,
can clearly implement their "new thinking" on innovation with-
out finding an innovation market. The agencies should, there-
fore, protect competition in future goods markets and should
stop propagating the innovation market myth.
X. NCRPA's INABILITY TO "PROPERLY DEFINED" AN INNOVATION
MARKET
In the National Cooperative Research and Production Act
Congress instructed the agencies to protect competition in inno-
vation markets. Congress told the agencies to protect competi-
tion in what it called "properly defined" innovation markets. In
the Act, Congress could not define an innovation market. Addi-
tionally, since Congress passed the Act the antitrust agencies
have also not been able to "properly define" an innovation mar-
ket. As this article has shown, the innovation market which the
agencies have "properly defined" is actually a future goods mar-
164 See In re Roche Holdings Ltd., 113 F.T.C. 1086, 1086 (1990) (dissenting opinion of
Commissioner Owen) (discussing elimination of competition in relevant markets); see
also Dahdouh & Mongoven supra note 1, at 430 n.101 (discussing Roche Holdings as hy-
brid involving both potential competition and innovation market theories); Hoerner, su-
pra note 1, at 56-58 (discussing use of innovation market theory to attack conglomerate
mergers as in Roche Holdings).
165 See Hoerner, supra note 1, at 56 (noting Commissioner's position that there was
substantial doubt about prospective entrants willingness and ability to enter market not
now performing competitively).
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ket.
This is so even though, in NCRPA's legislative history, Con-
gress told the agencies not to find future goods markets. 166 Yet,
despite this admonition, when the agencies protect competition
in future goods markets they actually implement the policy Con-
gress told the agencies to use innovation markets to implement.
Congress enacted the NCRPA to encourage American firms to
succeed in world markets. When the agencies protect competi-
tion in future goods markets they not only enforce the polices
Porter recommended in The Competitive Advantage of Nations,
they also enforce the economic policies which lead Congress to
enact the NCRPA. They encourage American firms to succeed in
world markets. Thus, even when the agencies use future goods
markets rather than innovation markets to enforce the NCRPA,
they implement the economic policies that Congress told the
agencies to use innovation markets to implement.
CONCLUSION
A. Agencies Have not Found an Innovation Market
The American antitrust authorities have never found an inno-
vation market. The agencies can not apply either Gilbert and
Sunshine's innovation market methodology, or the IP Guidelines'
less developed innovation market methodology. The agencies
will only be able to find an innovation market if they can develop
a methodology that will allow them to find an innovation market.
The agencies have not been able to develop this methodology,
and have therefore not been able to find an innovation market.
Without finding an innovation market, the agencies have
analyzed many cases in which the relevant firms were investing
in R&D to try to develop the same new product. In Wright Medi-
cal/Orthomet, for example, the FTC regulated the future goods
market for better orthopedic hand implants. In this case the
FTC would not allow the world's leading orthopedic hand im-
plant manufacturer to purchase its only potential competitor. In
GM/ZF the DOJ claimed to, but actually did not, regulate the
166 See id. "The purpose of the reports... is to inform.., of the effect of the NCRPA
on the competitiveness of the U.S. in key technological areas of research, development,
and production." Id.
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innovation market for improved heavy-duty automatic trans-
missions. In this case the DOJ actually regulated the relevant
future goods market. It did so because it did not have jurisdic-
tion over the relevant current goods market, which was in
Europe.
Moreover, as Tom and Newberg themselves correctly recog-
nize, the FTC has, without finding an innovation market, ana-
lyzed many transactions in which the relevant firms were trying
to develop, but had not yet developed, the same pharmaceutical
product. In these cases as well the FTC regulated competition in
future goods markets. Thus, in American Home Prod-
ucts/American Cyanamid the FTC preserved competition in the
future goods market for rotavirus vaccines. In Up-
john/Pharmacia the FTC preserved competition in the market
for future treatments for solid tumors. In Glaxo/Wellcome the
FTC preserved competition in the future market for oral antimi-
grane treatments. In Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz the FTC preserved
competition in the future goods markets for the four specific gene
therapy markets it identified. And in Baxter/Immuno the FTC
preserved competition in the future fibrin sealant market.
B. The Innovation Market Myth
Although the agencies have not found an innovation market,
many agency officials claim that the agencies have found such
markets. These officials have created the innovation market
myth.
Tom and Newberg are the latest officials to propagate the in-
novation market myth. Yet these officials claim that in only
three cases, Ciba Geigy, GM/ZF, and Sensormatic, have the
agencies found an innovation market. These officials, therefore,
acknowledge that in several other cases, in which other agency
officials have claimed that the agencies have found innovation
markets, the agencies did not in fact find such markets.
Yet these officials also continue to propagate the myth. Even
in the three cases in which these officials claim that the agencies
have found innovation markets the agencies have, in reality, not
found innovation markets.
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C. Innovation Markets, Future Goods Markets and the Agencies'
"New Thinking" on Innovation
In several of the cases in which Tom and Newberg, and others,
claim that the agencies found innovation markets, the agencies
have, in fact, not found innovation markets. In these cases the
agencies have instead found future goods markets, and have also
acted to stop firms from improperly erecting barriers to entry to
various markets. In these cases, therefore, the agencies imple-
mented their "new thinking" on innovation not only when they
found future goods markets, but also when they prevented the
firms from erecting barriers to entry.
For the past several years the agencies have acted aggressively
to stop firms from improperly erecting barriers to entry. The
agencies fear that these barriers will shield firms from competi-
tive pressures to innovate. In several cases the agencies have
not only found future goods markets, but have also implemented
this "new thinking" regarding barriers to entry. Thus, in Sen-
sormatic the FTC would not allow the relevant firms to develop
standards in a way which would allow them to block entry into
the future goods market. In Microsoft/Intuit and Ciba Geigy the
agencies would not allow the relevant firms to use intellectual
property rights in a way which would anticompetitively block ac-
cess to the relevant market.
In these cases the agencies implemented their "new thinking"
regarding competition to innovate, but did so without finding an
innovation market. Innovation markets are, therefore, not, as
one writer has suggested, the "centerpiece" of the agencies' "new
thinking" on innovation.
D. When the Agencies Protect Competition in Future Goods
Markets They Implement Porter's Economic Policy
When the agencies protect competition in future goods mar-
kets they implement the economic policy Porter recommends.
When the agencies protect competition in these future goods
markets they ensure that competitive pressures force firms to
innovate. They, therefore, ensure that firms will develop better
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products and succeed on world markets.
Tom and Newberg, and other agencies officials, should there-
fore not advocate that the antitrust agencies either find innova-
tion markets or try to regulate "innovation effects." These offi-
cials should simply accept that when the agencies protect
competition in future goods markets they implement the policy
prescriptions which these officials incorrectly say they must use
innovation markets to implement. These officials should there-
fore protect competition in future goods markets. They should
do so when applying the antitrust laws generally, and when en-
forcing the NCRPA. They should not propagate the innovation
market myth.

